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ABSTRACT
My dissertation consists of three essays in the Metaphysics of Modality:
In "A Puzzle about Truth and Singular Propositions," I consider two theses that seem to be true and then an
argument for the conclusion that they form an inconsistent pair. One thesis is that a proposition that is
singular with respect to a given object implies that the object exists. This is so because the proposition
predicates something of the object. The other thesis is that some propositions are true with respect to possible
worlds in which they do not exist. An example is the negation of the proposition that Socrates is wise. This
proposition is true with respect to possible worlds in which Socrates does not exist, but it does not exist in
those worlds.
In "Actualism, Ontological Dependence, and Possible Worlds," I consider Actualism, the doctrine that every
possible object is an actual object. Plantinga has argued that the actualist is committed to the existence of
unexemplified essences if he analyzes statements of modality by quantifying over possible worlds and over
members of their domains. I argue that the actualist is committed to the existence of unexemplified essences
even if he paraphrases statements of modality by quantifying only over possible worlds and actual objects.
In "Possibilism and the Nature of Actuality," I consider Possibilism, the doctrine that there are possible
objects that are not actual objects. Possibilism seems to be a coherent ontological doctrine. It is not
Meinong's doctrine that there are objects of which it is true to say that there are no such objects. If one fails
to distinguish between these two doctrines, then one's attempt to refute Possibilism might amount to an attack
on a blatant contradiction. I illustrate this claim by arguing that the distinction between Possibilism and
Meinong's doctrine has eluded Plantinga. I then consider the view that Possibilism is a consequence of
Lewis's doctrine that 'actual' is an indexical term. I also argue that the sense in which Lewis said that 'actual'
is indexical is an esoteric sense of the word, not a sense it ordinarily has.
Thesis Supervisor: Robert C. Stalnaker
Title: Professor and Chair
A Puzzle about Truth and Singular Propositions1
1. Singular Propositions
Suppose I point to the man in front of me and, referring to him, I say, "He is wise": I predicate of
him that he is wise. In so doing-in saying about a particular object to which I directly refer that
it is so-and-so--I assert a singular proposition with respect to the object of my reference. For the
purposes of exposition I will assume that proper names are purely designative: their only
semantic function is to designate objects. On this assumption, the singular proposition with
respect to the philosopher who drank hemlock that he is wise is the proposition that is ordinarily
asserted when a speaker assertively utters the sentence 'Socrates is wise'. It is the proposition
that the sentence 'Socrates is wise' ordinarily expresses, namely the proposition that Socrates is
wise.
There is implicit disagreement in the literature as to what counts as a singular proposition. With
vague qualifications, Plantinga suggests the following characterization of singular propositions:
Let us say, provisionally, that a singular proposition is one that is about some specific object-its subject-and
either predicates or denies some property of that object (Plantinga 1974: 136).2
As an example of a singular proposition that denies a property of its subject, Plantinga gives the
'I have benefited from discussions with Richard L. Cartwright, Robert C. Stalnaker, and Stephen Yablo. Special
thanks are due to Peter B. M. Vranas. He is present throughout this dissertation because of his painstaking
suggestions, philosophical and editorial.
2 Plantinga immediately continues: "No doubt this characterization is in the long run deficient in several respects; it
may still serve our present purposes." He does not explain.
proposition:
N' It is false that Socrates was snub-nosed.
It does not seem true to me that N'denies of Socrates the property of being snub-nosed. I would
say that to deny of Socrates the property of being snub-nosed is to say something to the effect
that Socrates is such that he does not have the property of being snub-nosed. But N'says nothing
to that effect. Rather, it classifies the proposition:
N Socrates was snub-nosed
as false: it denies that Socrates was snub-nosed. Anyhow, this reservation is perhaps merely
terminological, as Plantinga (1974: 150) does distinguish between N'and
N" Socrates was non-snub-nosed.
But is N' singular to begin with? To count as singular, N'must be about some specific object. I
think that if N' is about some object at all, then it is about some specific object. If the only
semantic function of the word 'Socrates' is to designate (to pick out, so to speak) Socrates, then
ifN'is about Socrates at all, then N'is specifically about Socrates. But is N'about Socrates? You
might say that, in some sense, N'must be about Socrates: it denies that he (not Plato or Aristotle)
was snub-nosed. But if N'is about Socrates, what does it say about him? You might suggest that
N' says about Socrates that he was not snub-nosed. But then you would be confusing N'with the
singular proposition N" It is N"that says about Socrates that he was an object x such that it is not
the case that x was snub-nosed. In contrast with N" it seems to me that N' is not about Socrates
and is therefore not singular with respect to Socrates. My reason for thinking that N'is not about
Socrates is that N'does not require for its truth that there even be such an object as Socrates. Had
Socrates not existed, it would have been false that Socrates was snub-nosed; N'would have been
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true. If N'does not require for its truth that there be such an object as Socrates, then I do not see
how N'could be about Socrates.
2. Existential Implication
It seems to be necessary that, should there have been no such object as Socrates, it would have
been false that Socrates were wise. Equivalently, it seems to be necessary that, should Socrates
be wise, there would be such an object as Socrates. This point concerning the singular
proposition with respect to Socrates that he is wise carries over, I suppose, to singular
propositions with respect to any contingent existent. We seem to have a general principle of
existential implication:
El Every proposition that is singular with respect to a contingent existent implies that
the object exists.
But isn't N a counterexample to EI? N is singular with respect to Socrates: it says of him that he
was snub-nosed. But N does not imply that Socrates exists; it implies only that he existed in the
past, when he was snub-nosed. Or consider the proposition:
D Socrates is dead.
D is also singular with respect to Socrates. It says something about him, namely that he is dead.
But D does not imply that Socrates exists. If Socrates is dead, then he no longer exists, so D, like
N, implies only that Socrates existed in the past. I think that the response to this kind of objection
to El should be that we leave time out of our considerations altogether. When we say that
Socrates exists (present tense) we do not mean that he exists in the present. Rather, we mean that
he exists at some point in time: past, present, or future.
It seems that one can still think of counterexamples to El. Consider the proposition:
P Socrates is possible.
P seems to be singular with respect to Socrates. It says of that very man that he exists in some
possible world. But existence in some possible world does not imply existence in the actual
world, so P does not imply that there actually is such an object as Socrates. In response, I think
that one should point out that the application of the adjective 'possible' to an object calls for an
explanation in terms of a possibility operator. This operator might be assigned two different
scopes in the analysis of the sentence 'Socrates is possible'. First, it might have the closed
sentence 'Socrates exists' in its scope, in which case the resulting proposition would be
P1  Possibly, Socrates exists.
P1 is not a counterexample to El because it is not singular with respect to Socrates: it does not
predicate of him that he is so-and-so. Rather, it classifies the singular existential proposition
E Socrates exists
as a possible truth. On another reading of the sentence 'Socrates is possible', the possibility
operator has an open sentence in its scope, namely 'x exists':
P2  Socrates is an object x such that possibly, x exists.
Unlike P1, P2 is singular with respect to Socrates but it is not a counterexample to El, because it
does imply that Socrates exists. How could Socrates be such that it is possible that he should
exist if did not exist?
One can think of another alleged counterexample to EL. Suppose it is said that, had Socrates not
existed, he would have been nonexistent. It might be inferred that the singular proposition that
Socrates is nonexistent does not imply that Socrates exists and is therefore a counterexample to
6
EI. In response, I think it ought to be pointed out that every singular proposition Fa has two
negations: a non-singular negation and a singular negation. The non-singular negation of a
singular proposition Fa is the proposition that classifies Fa as false:
S' It is false that Socrates is wise
is the non-singular negation of the proposition
S Socrates is wise.
On the other hand, the singular negation of a singular proposition Fa is a proposition that says of
the object a that it is an object x such that it is false that x is F: the singular proposition
S" Socrates is unwise
is the singular negation of S. 3 Similarly, we can distinguish between two negations of the singular
proposition E: the non-singular proposition
E' It is false that Socrates exists
is one negation of E, and the singular proposition
E" Socrates is nonexistent
is another negation of E. Now in either case we do not have a counterexample to El E' is not
singular with respect to Socrates: it does not say of him that he is so-and-so. Rather, E'classifies
the singular proposition E as false. On the other hand, E" is singular with respect to Socrates. It
says of him that he is an object that does not exist: an object x such that it is not the case that x
exists. But if E" is analogous to S' then E" does imply that Socrates exists and hence is not a
3 The non-singular negation of S'is S. The singular negation of S"is again S. The singular proposition S"is logically
equivalent to the conjunction of the singular existential proposition E and the non-singular proposition
Vx(x=Socrates--(wise x)). Call the latter G1. GC1 does not require for its truth that Socrates (or anything else for that
matter) exist: it only rules out the possibility that there should be such a wise object as Socrates. The singular
proposition S is logically equivalent to the conjunction of the singular E and the non-singular: Vx(x=Socrates-wise
x). Call the latter G2. Each of the singular propositions S and S" is logically equivalent to the negation of the non-
singular conjunct of the other: S is equivalent to the negation of G1, and S"is equivalent to the negation of G2.
counterexample to El. (Since E" implies that Socrates exists and says of him that he does not
exist, E"is necessarily false.)
As a corollary of EI, every proposition that is singular with respect to a contingent existent lends
itself to Existential Generalization. Every such proposition Fa, in conjunction with the
proposition that there is such an object as a, implies that there are objects that are F. If El is true,
then every proposition Fa that is singular with respect to a contingent existent implies that there
are objects that are F. Thus, S implies that there are wise objects. It also follows that the singular
negation of any such proposition-the singular proposition with respect to a that it is an object x
such that it is not the case that x is F-implies that, for some object x, it is not the case that x is F.
Thus, S" implies that there are objects that are not wise. On the other hand, the non-singular
negation of a singular proposition Fa does not lend itself to existential generalization. We cannot
infer from it not being the case that a is F that there are objects that are not F. Thus, S'does not
imply that there are objects that are not wise.
3. A Puzzle
Some philosophers hold the following doctrine of ontological dependence:
OD Propositions that are singular with respect to contingent existents depend for their
existence on the existence of their subjects.
If OD is true, then had Socrates not existed there would have been no such proposition as
S Socrates is wise.
This doctrine carries over, I suppose, to (non-singular) negations of propositions that are singular
with respect to contingent existents. Thus, like S,
S' It is false that Socrates is wise
depends for its existence on the existence of Socrates.
El implies that every proposition that is singular with respect to a contingent existent is false with
respect to every possible world in which its subject does not exist. El therefore implies that the
non-singular negation of every proposition that is singular with respect to a contingent existent is
true with respect to every possible world in which its subject does not exist. This, in conjunction
with OD, implies that the non-singular negation of every proposition that is singular with respect
to a contingent existent is a proposition that is true with respect to possible worlds in which that
non-singular negation does not exist. Since there are non-singular negations of propositions that
are singular with respect to contingent existents-S' is one such proposition-the following
doctrine about truth and existence holds:
TE Some propositions are true with respect to possible worlds in which they do not
exist.
We have two theses, namely El and TE, which seem to be true.
But here is a puzzle-a puzzle about truth and singular propositions, if you will-in the form of
an argument for the conclusion that El and TE form an inconsistent pair. I will argue that, if TE is
true, then El is false. Suppose that TE is true. Let P be a proposition that is true with respect to
some possible world in which it does not exist. Since P is true with respect to some possible
world in which P does not exist, P does not imply that P exists. Now, let T(P) be the singular
proposition with respect to P that it is true. P and T(P) are logically equivalent. Since P does not
imply that P exists, T(P) does not imply that P exists. So here we have a counterexample to El:
T(P) is a singular proposition that does not imply that the object it is about (namely P) exists.
A case in point would be any non-singular negation of a proposition that is singular with respect
to a contingent existent. Let T(S') be the singular proposition with respect to:
S' It is false that Socrates is wise
that it is true. S'is true with respect to possible worlds in which Socrates does not exist. Possible
worlds in which Socrates does not exist are possible worlds in which S' does not exist. Since
T(S') and S'are logically equivalent, T(S ) is true with respect to possible worlds in which S'does
not exist. T(S) is therefore a counterexample to EI: it is a singular proposition that does not
imply that the object it is about (namely S) exists.
4. Ontological Dependence
It might be pointed out that, although I presented the puzzle as an argument for the conclusion
that TE and El form an inconsistent pair, I derived TE from the conjunction of OD and EI So
perhaps the puzzle should be taken as a consideration against OD, as an argument for the
conclusion that singular propositions do not depend ontologically on their subjects after all. But,
other than the puzzle, do we have any reason for thinking that OD is false? It might be argued
against OD that the thesis:
OD' Necessarily, E'exists only if Socrates exists.4
implies that E'is not a possible truth. Here are three arguments for the conclusion that E'is not a
possible truth:
4 OD' follows from the doctrine that Socrates-the man himself, not an individual essence of his, or some other
abstract entity that might somehow represent him-is an essential constituent of E' You might think that the idea
that concrete objects could be constituents of (presumably abstract) propositions is mysterious. Should we also say
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Argument 1. Every proposition is true, sure enough, only if it exists. It may seem that the
following also holds:
A, For every proposition P, necessarily, if P is true, then P exists.
A1 and OD'imply in conjunction that E'is not a possible truth. Necessarily, if Socrates does not
exist, then (by OD ) E'does not exist. Necessarily, if E'does not exist, then (by A1) E'is not true.
It follows that, necessarily, if Socrates does not exist, E' is not true. It is also necessary that if
Socrates does exist, then E'is not true. Necessarily, then, E'is not true. E'is not a possible truth.
For every proposition P, let T(P) be the singular proposition with respect to P that it is true.
Argument 2. Let's see first that OD 'and
El Every proposition that is singular with respect to a contingent existent implies that
the object exists.
imply in conjunction that T(E)---the singular proposition with respect to E'that it is true-is not
a possible truth. Suppose, for reductio, that T(E ) is a possible truth. Let W be a possible world
with respect to which T(E) is true. By El, E'exists in W. By OD" Socrates exists in W. It follows
that E'is false with respect to W (E' is the proposition that it is false that Socrates exists). But if
so, then T(E) is false with respect to W, and the reductio is complete. T(E) is therefore not a
possible truth. Next, consider the following thesis:
A2  For every proposition P, it is possible that P be true just in case T(P) is a possible
truth.
A2 seems to be true. By analogy, for every object x, it is possible that x be wise just in case the
singular proposition with respect to x that it is wise is a possible truth. Now if T(E) is not a
that concrete objects could not be members of sets? Presumably, sets are abstract objects.
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possible truth, then (by A2) it is not possible that E'be true; in other words, E' is not a possible
truth.
Argument 3. OD' implies that E' is essentially false. Necessarily, should there be such a
proposition as E'at all, then (by OD) Socrates would exist. But should Socrates exist, E'would
be false (E'is the proposition that it is false that Socrates exists). Necessarily then, E' exists only
if it is false: E'is essentially false. But consider the following thesis:
A3  For every proposition P, if P is essentially false, then P is not a possible truth.
A3 seems to be true. By analogy, for every object x, if x is essentially inhuman, then x is not a
possible human. If E'is essentially false, then (by A 3) it is not a possible truth.
These were arguments for the conclusion that E'is not a possible truth. But E'is a possible truth.
First, there is such a proposition as E'. The distinction between S' and S" seems clear. If there is
such a proposition as S' then it is hard to see why there would not be such a proposition as E'.
Second, since there is such a proposition as E' had Socrates not existed, E' would have been
true. Third, Socrates is a contingent existent; he such that it is possible that he should have never
existed. It follows that E'is such that it is possible that it should have been true: E'is a possible
truth. Opponents of OD might infer that OD'--which is a premise of each of the arguments-is
false. In response to this objection to OD, I would grant that each of the arguments has a false
premise. In each of the arguments, I think that the false premise is not OD' I think that the
premises A1, A2, and A3 are all false. I will now argue for the conclusion that E'falsifies each of
them.
E' falsifies A1. E' is such that it is not necessary that it exist for it to be true. Had Socrates not
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existed, E'would have been true but (by OD) there would have been no such proposition as E'
You might object. OD' implies that, had Socrates not existed, there would have been no such
proposition as E'to speak of. Had there been no such proposition as E' there would have been no
such true proposition as E'. It follows that E'would not have been true-or so the objection goes.
In response I would grant that, had Socrates not existed, there would have been no such true
proposition as E' But I am inclined to think that it does not follow that E'would not have been
true. This is how Cartwright illustrates the matter:
By way of an analogy, consider this question: if the Arabic numeral system had never been devised, what would
have been the truth value of the sentence '2+3=5'? Some will say that had the Arabic numeral system never
been devised, there would have been no such sentence as '2+3=5.' Maybe that's what should be said. But the
Arabic numeral system was devised, and hence we have the sentence '2+3=5'; we can therefore ask what the
truth value of that sentence is with respect to a counterfactual situation in which people do not use Arabic
numerals but use, say, Roman numerals instead (Cartwright 1997: 77).
Paraphrasing Cartwright, we can say that Socrates does exist, and hence we have the proposition
E we can therefore ask what the truth value of that proposition is with respect to a
counterfactual situation in which the proposition does not exist. I think the answer should be that
E' ---the proposition that it is false that Socrates exists-is true with respect to every situation in
which Socrates does not exist. It might be said that, in some sense, E' would not have been true
had Socrates not existed-if it is the case that, had Socrates not existed, there would have been
no such true proposition as E'. I would take issue with that. I do not think that these
considerations suggest an ambiguity in the word 'true' or in the phrase 'would have been true'.
E'falsifies A2. It is possible that E'be true: had Socrates not existed, E'would have been true.
But T(E) is not a possible truth. Here is why. The singular proposition with respect to any object
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x that it is F is a possible truth if and only if x is F in some possible world. If and only if, that is,
for some possible world W, x would have been among the Fs that would have existed had W
obtained. Thus, the singular proposition with respect to Socrates that he is a carpenter is a
possible truth if and only if Socrates is a carpenter in some possible world. If and only if, that is,
for some possible world W, Socrates would have been among the carpenters that would have
existed had W obtained. Similarly, T(E) is a possible truth if and only if E' is true in some
possible world. If and only if, that is, for some possible world W, E'would have been among the
true propositions that would have existed had W obtained. But for no possible world W, is E'
among the true propositions that would have existed had W obtained. For every possible world W
in which Socrates exists, if E'is among the propositions that would have existed had W obtained,
then E' is among the false propositions that would have existed had W obtained. For every
possible world W in which Socrates does not exist, (by OD) E' is not among the propositions
that would have existed had W obtained. If so, then E'is not among the true propositions that
would have existed had W obtained. T(E) is therefore not a possible truth.
E' falsifies A3. E' is both a possible truth and an essentially false proposition. First, E' is a
possible truth: a proposition is a possible truth if and only if it is true with respect to some
possible world. If and only if, that is, the proposition is such that, had some possible world
obtained, it would have been true. E' is true with respect to every possible world in which
Socrates does not exist. There are possible worlds in which Socrates does not exist, since
Socrates is a contingent existent. Second, E'is essentially false: necessarily, should there be such
a proposition as E' then (by OD) Socrates would exist and E'--the proposition that it is false
that Socrates exists-would be false. Notice that (by OD) possible worlds in which Socrates
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does not exist are possible worlds in which E'does not exist. Possible worlds in which Socrates
does not exist therefore do not falsify the thesis that E'is false in every possible world in which
E'exists, the thesis that E'is essentially false.
It might be objected that predicates are true of objects only with respect to possible worlds in
which the objects exist. If so, then E' is not true with respect to possible worlds in which E'does
not exist-or so the objection would go. In response, I would grant the premise of this argument,
but not its conclusion. Predication is absolute when we say of an object that it is so-and-so.
Predication is world-relative when we say of an object that it is so-and-so in a given world: when
we predicate, with respect to the world, of the object that it is so-and-so. Absolute predication
implies existence: Socrates is a carpenter only if Socrates exists, E' is true only if E' exists.
World-relative predication implies that the object of which something is predicated exists in the
world with respect to which something is predicated. To say that Socrates is a carpenter in a
world W is to say that, had W obtained, there would have been such a carpenter as Socrates: there
would have been an object x that would have been both a carpenter and identical with Socrates.
Thus, Socrates is a carpenter only in worlds in which he exists.5 Similarly, to say that E'is true in
a world W is to say that, had W obtained, there would have been such a true proposition as E':
there would have been a proposition P that would have been both true and identical with E'.
Thus, E'is true only in worlds in which it exists.
It might seem as if we sometimes predicate something of an object with respect to possible
worlds in which the object does not exist. It might seem as if we say of an object x that it is so-
SNote that it is true of Socrates only with respect to possible worlds in which he exists that he is a carpenter in some
possible worlds. On the other hand, it is true with respect to every possible world that Socrates is a carpenter in some
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and-so in a possible world W, when x does not exist in W. For example, we say that Socrates is a
contingent existent. This might seem to mean that Socrates is such that, in some possible world,
he is a nonexistent object: in some possible world he is an object x such that it is not the case that
x exists. That is not what we say (anyhow that is not what we would say upon reflection). In fact,
we predicate (absolutely) of Socrates that he is an object x such that, for some possible world W,
it is not the case that x exists in W. We say of Socrates that (actually) he is an object x such that,
had some world W obtained, it would have been false that x existed. Truth with respect to a
possible world W is similar to nonexistence in W. When we say of E'that it is true with respect
to W we do not predicate of E'with respect to W that it is true: we do not say that E'is true in the
world W. Rather, we predicate (absolutely) of E'that it is true with respect to W. We predicate
(absolutely) of E'that it actually has the world relative property of being true with respect to W.
Now E'depends for its truth on the nonexistence of Socrates and E'depends for its existence on
the existence of Socrates. There are therefore no possible worlds in which E' is true. E' is true
with respect to some possible worlds, but it is not true in them. E'is therefore not a possible truth
in the sense that Socrates is a possible carpenter. Socrates is an object x such that, for some
possible world W, x is a carpenter in W, but E'is not a proposition P such that, for some possible
world W, P is true in W.
5. Propositions as Subjects of Singular Propositions
It might be pointed out that the puzzle has the following presupposition:
possible worlds.
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SP There are singular propositions that have propositions as their subjects. 6
Perhaps the puzzle should be taken as a consideration against SP. But, other than the puzzle, do
we have any reason for thinking that there are no singular propositions that have propositions as
their subjects? It might be argued that, to assert a singular proposition, one would have to utter a
sentence in which a purely designative phrase-a phrase whose only semantic function is to
designate an object-occupies the subject position. It might be argued furthermore that
propositions are not the sort of object that purely designative phrases could designate. If so, then
whenever we say something about a particular proposition, the proposition we assert is not
singular with respect to the proposition of reference-or so the argument against SP would go.
Suppose I say, "It is true that Socrates is wise." Don't I assert a singular proposition about the
proposition:
S Socrates is wise?
Perhaps the first thing to note about the sentence I utter is that it is ambiguous. On the one hand,
it can express the proposition that it is true of Socrates that he is wise, which is the singular
proposition S. On the other hand, the sentence can express a proposition that classifies S as true.
The view under consideration is that the latter proposition, although about S, is not singular with
respect to S. The reason for that is that the sentence I utter contains descriptive apparatus in
subject position: the phrase 'that Socrates is wise' describes the proposition of reference S, it
does not merely pick it out. The argument against SP is that there is no way to refer to a
proposition save by using a description.
A friend of SP might suggest that I would assert the singular proposition with respect to any
6 If SP is false, then there is at least one kind of object that you will not find in the domain of propositional functions:
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given proposition that it is true, if I referred to the proposition by name and then proceeded to
predicate of it that it is true. Let Soc be the proposition that Socrates is wise. Consider the
following proposition: Soc is true. Isn't this proposition the singular proposition with respect to
the proposition that Socrates is wise that it is true? Here perhaps what should be said is that,
although the word 'Soc' is grammatically a name, in the circumstances we describe it is not
purely designative: it does not serve as a mere tag whose only semantic function is to designate
the proposition of reference. The word 'Soc' is what Russell (1919: 218) would call an
abbreviated description. We seem to introduce an arbitrary name for a particular proposition but,
in fact, a descriptive phrase-the phrase "the proposition that Socrates is wise"-is doing the
semantic work. This descriptive phrase may not be a definite description of the form "the x such
that Fx" but it is a description nevertheless: it contains information that fully identifies the
proposition of reference. In contrast with the word 'Soc', in the introduction of a real proper
name (such as 'Socrates'), it is possible to avoid using any description of the object named. One
can use a demonstrative phrase in the introduction of a proper name. It is (or was) possible to
point to Socrates and say, "Let the name 'Socrates' name this". Thus, the name 'Socrates' gives
us no information whatever about the man Socrates. In the case of reference to propositions, the
introduction of the object of reference by means of a descriptive phrase is unavoidable. You
cannot point to a proposition: a proposition is an abstract object that is nowhere to be found.
Despite appearances then, the alleged name 'Soc' is not a proper name and the asserted
proposition (namely that Soc is true) is not singular.
In response to this line of reasoning, I would deny that, for a speaker to assert a singular
propositions.
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proposition, he would have to utter a sentence in which a purely designative phrase occupies the
subject position. Perhaps this much is right: for a sentence to express a singular proposition, it
would have to have a purely designative phrase in its subject position. If so, then the sentence 'It
is true that Socrates is wise' (or 'The proposition that Socrates is wise is true') does not express a
singular proposition with respect to S. But it does not seem true that a speaker must use a purely
designative phrase in referring to an object in order to assert a singular proposition about the
object. There can be direct speaker's reference without direct semantic reference: a speaker can
refer directly to an object by using a term that is not purely designative.7 I think that would be the
case if the speaker used a definite description referentially in Donnellan's sense:
... suppose that Jones has been charged with Smith's murder and has been placed on trial. Imagine that there is
a discussion of Jones's odd behavior at his trial. We might sum up our impression of his behavior by saying,
"Smith's murderer is insane." If someone asks to whom we are referring, by using this description, the answer
here is "Jones" (Donnellan 1966: 237).
Here the speaker is using a definite description, namely the phrase 'Smith's murderer', to refer
directly to Jones. If so, then the proposition that the speaker asserts-what I would call the
speaker's proposition-is singular with respect to Jones even though a descriptive phrase
occupies the subject position in the sentence which the speaker has assertively uttered. The
content of the description in use seems to be irrelevant to the content of the assertion; it is not
part of what is being asserted that Jones is Smith's murderer. If so, then the speaker's proposition
depends for its truth only on whether Jones is insane and is therefore the singular proposition
with respect to Jones that he is insane, it is the proposition which the speaker would have
asserted had he assertively uttered the sentence 'Jones is insane'. In contrast with the speaker's
7 The distinction between a speaker's reference and the semantic reference is Kripke's. See Kripke 1977: 255.
8 It might be objected that the speaker did not merely pick out Jones, he also misdescribed him as Smith's murderer:
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proposition, the semantic proposition-the proposition that is expressed by the sentence that the
speaker has assertively uttered-depends on the semantic functions of the words of which the
uttered sentence is composed. In our case, the semantic proposition is not singular because the
phrase that occupies the subject position in the uttered sentence is not purely designative.
Suppose that-contrary to what we believe-Jones did not murder Smith: the murderer was in
fact a sane man who goes by the name 'Henry'. The semantic proposition is false: Henry-the
semantic referent of the phrase 'Smith's murderer'-is not insane. 9
The upshot of the distinction between the speaker's proposition and the semantic proposition is
that from the fact that a speaker assertively utters a sentence that has a descriptive phrase in
subject position it cannot be inferred that the proposition he asserts is not singular. The speaker's
proposition is singular if the speaker uses the descriptive phrase to refer directly to an object and
then predicates something of the object. Similarly, if a speaker assertively utters a sentence that
has a descriptive phrase that refers to a proposition in subject position, then it cannot be inferred
that the proposition the speaker asserts is not singular with respect to the proposition of
reference. The proposition the speaker asserts is singular with respect to the proposition of
reference if the speaker has referred directly to that proposition. So, even if we grant that
propositions are not the sort of objects that can be the semantic referent of a purely designative
phrase, the question remains: Can a speaker ever refer directly to a proposition?
he described Jones as something Jones is not. If so, then the asserted proposition calls for a correction. Therefore,
although the speaker said something true of Jones (namely that he is insane), the asserted proposition is not the
proposition that Jones is. insane--or so the objection would go. I would reply that the fact that a correction is in order
does not imply that the description of Jones as Smith's murderer is part of the content of the assertion. I would say
that it is the speaker that is to be corrected, not the proposition he asserted. It seems to me that, in conversation,
people sometimes correct each other in ways that do not bear on the truth conditions of what they assert.
9 I think that the semantic proposition can be said to be about Henry, in the trivial sense that Henry is Smith's
murderer. It might be objected that, if so, then the speaker does not know whom he is talking about. This would be a
mistake. The speaker is not talking about Henry: he is talking about Jones.
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It might be argued, in support of SP, that if the speaker used the phrase 'Smith's murderer' to
refer directly to Jones, then he might as well have referred directly to an assertion of Jones's.
Suppose that, in his trial, Jones says, "Smith was the most lovable person in the world". You say
in response, "What Smith's murderer has just said is true." If by 'Smith's murderer' you referred
to Jones, then by 'what Smith's murderer has just said' you referred to the proposition that Jones
has asserted. But was your reference to the proposition that Jones has asserted direct? If it was,
then the proposition you asserted is singular with respect to the proposition that Smith was the
most lovable person in the world. It might be replied that your reference to the proposition that
Jones has asserted was not direct. The phrase you used is perhaps semantically equivalent to the
phrase 'what Jones has just said', yet it is a descriptive phrase.
But then, why can't we say, in support of SP, that you may have used the description 'what
Smith's murderer has just said' to refer directly to the proposition that Jones has asserted, just as
you have used the description 'Smith's murderer' to refer directly to Jones? It might be replied
that, when a speaker uses a definite description to refer directly to an object, then, in place of the
definite description, it is possible for him to use a demonstrative pronoun to the same effect. In
Donnellan's example of a referential use of the definite description 'Smith's murderer', the
speaker could have pointed to Jones and said, 'He is insane'. He would have then asserted the
singular proposition with respect to Jones that he is insane. But, again, the problem is that one
cannot point to a proposition. In response, it could be argued, in support of SP, that we often use
pronouns non-demonstratively to refer directly to propositions. First, a speaker assertively utters
a sentence and asserts a proposition; then somebody refers to the asserted proposition as this, that
or it and proceeds to predicate something of the proposition of reference. Thus, in response to
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'Jones's statement in court you could have said, "That is true". It seems that you would have
asserted a proposition that would be singular with respect to Jones's proposition.
Here is another example that may suggest that such reference to a proposition might be direct.
Suppose we are trying to figure out where we first met. You say, "We first met near the bank."
Let's call the proposition you asserted B. I then recall our first meeting and concur saying, "That
is true." It seems that the proposition I asserted is singular with respect to B. Here the word 'that',
as I used it, is not an abbreviation of the description 'what you have just said'. Suppose that by
'bank' you actually meant "riverbank". Let W be a possible world in which by 'bank' you meant
"a financial institution". Let B' be the proposition you assert in W. My actual statement is true
with respect to W just in case B, not B' is true with respect to W. But if my response were
equivalent to "What you have just said is true," it would be true with respect to Wjust in case B',
not B, is true with respect to W. It might be objected that the pronoun 'that', as I used it in the
dialog, is anaphoric: it has an antecedent in the sentence you uttered. It is anaphoric, I would
agree, but I do not think that it is on that account indirectly referential. If you say, "Socrates is
wise" you assert S. If I concur saying, "He is wise," I think I assert S all over again. If so, then the
pronoun 'he', as I use it here, is anaphoric and directly referential.' 0
I do not have to rely on the (widely accepted) doctrine that proper names are purely designative
to make the point that anaphoric pronouns might be directly referential. Suppose you say, "A
man jumped off the bridge today" and I respond, "He did not jump, he was pushed." It seems to
me that the occurrences of the word 'he' here are anaphoric and directly referential. Otherwise,
0 You might say that, by definition, anaphoric expressions are indirect, as they refer via their antecedent expressions.
I would reply that this makes anaphoric expressions indirect in an irrelevant sense. If you asked me whether I heard
the news directly from Smith and I said, "No, he told them to me over the telephone", that would be indirect in an
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what would be an apt description that I could have used instead of the word 'he'? The description
'the man who jumped off the bridge' will not do, not only because (let's suppose) two men
jumped off that bridge that day, but also because (presumably) the man we are referring to did
not jump off the bridge; he was pushed."' It seems to me that, in response to your statement, I
asserted a proposition that was singular with respect to the man we both had in mind.
6. Propositions as Complex Objects
The puzzle I presented may be of particular interest to philosophers who hold the doctrine that
singular propositions are complex objects that have objects and properties as constituents.
Complex-object theorists would be inclined to accept the presuppositions of the puzzle, namely
SP and OD.
The doctrine that singular propositions are complex objects does not imply SP, but I guess that
complex-object theorists would be inclined to accept SP. They might offer the following
reasoning in favor of SP. To assert a singular proposition about an object, a speaker would have
to refer directly to the object and predicate something of it. Thus, one cannot assert propositions
that are singular with respect to objects one cannot refer to directly. For the purposes of
illustration, suppose we held the doctrine that, to refer to an object directly, one would have to be
acquainted with the object. Suppose we also held the extreme view that one is only really
acquainted with oneself. We would then have to maintain that one could only refer directly to
irrelevant sense. Contrast that with a situation in which Smith told the news to Jones and Jones told them to me.
" It might be suggested that the description 'the man you and I are referring to' could substitute for the pronoun 'he'
as it figures in our dialogue. I would take issue with that on the ground that the proposition I asserted in the dialogue
does not require for its truth that you and i refer to something, nor that we exist, for that matter. Your next move
might be to rigidify the proposed substitute description. I would then amend my objection correspondingly: what I
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oneself (suppose the pronoun 'I' would do the job) and that, therefore, the singular propositions
one could assert are only about oneself. When I would say, "I am wise," I would assert the
singular proposition with respect to myself that I am wise, but I would only be able to assert non-
singular propositions to the effect that Socrates is wise. I would not be able to assert S, the
singular proposition which Socrates would assert if he assertively uttered the sentence 'I am
wise'. Now what if, for some odd reason, Socrates could not refer directly to himself? If nobody
could refer directly to others, nobody would be able to assert S. Still, there would be (I suppose)
such a singular proposition as S. The point is that S does not depend for its existence on being
asserted by anybody, or on the existence of speakers who are able to assert it. The complex-
object theorist would attribute this ontological independence of S to the kind of object he takes S
to be. If S is, say, an orderedpair that consists of Socrates and the property of being wise, then S
does not depend for its existence on being asserted by anybody, or on the existence of speakers
who are able to assert it. The complex-object theorist might argue that, similarly, even if nobody
can refer directly to propositions and (therefore) nobody can assert singular propositions about
propositions, if there are any propositions, and if there are any properties, then there must also be
ordered pairs of propositions and properties. There must therefore also be singular propositions
about propositions: SP must be true.
I think it is true that propositions do not depend for their existence on being asserted, or on the
existence of speakers who are able to assert them. Still, propositions depend for their existence
on the possibility of being asserted. The notion of an unassertable proposition-a proposition it
is not possible to assert--seems to be problematic, perhaps like the notion of an idea it is
say does not require for its truth that you and I actually refer to something.
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impossible to grasp. Thus, if it is impossible to refer directly to propositions, then it is not clear
how there could be any singular propositions that have propositions as their subjects.
Complex-object theorists would also be inclined to accept the other presupposition of the puzzle,
namely OD. If
S Socrates is wise
is an ordered pair that consists of Socrates and the property of being wise, then S depends for its
existence on the existence of Socrates. Unless he finds a way to undermine EI, the complex-
object theorist who accepts SP might respond to the puzzle by rejecting the following thesis of
logical equivalence:
LE For every proposition P, P and the singular proposition with respect to P that it is
true are logically equivalent.
LE is an assumption in the argument for the conclusion that TE and EI form an inconsistent pair.
I think it may be hard to reject LE, save by rejecting
TP For every proposition P, there is such a proposition as the singular proposition
with respect to P that it is true.
It might be suggested that even if there are singular propositions that have propositions as their
subjects, there are no singular propositions that predicate truth of their subjects. This might be
said in response to the puzzle but, other than the puzzle, do we have any reason for thinking that
this should be so?
Perhaps the complex-object theorist who accepts SP would respond to the puzzle by rejecting a
thesis that is weaker than LE. For all propositions P and Q, let's say that P and Q are necessary
equivalents just in case for every possible world W, P is true with respect to W if and only if Q is
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true with respect to W. Here is the puzzle again. Assuming that TE is true, let P be a proposition
that is true with respect to some possible world W in which it does not exist. Suppose further that
the following thesis of necessary equivalence holds:
NE For every proposition P, P and the singular proposition with respect to P that it is
true are necessary equivalents.
Since P is true with respect to W, (by NE) T(P)-the singular proposition with respect to P that it
is true-is true with respect to W. But P does not exist in W. If so, T(P) does not imply that P
exists. Again, T(P) is a counterexample to El: it is a singular proposition that does not imply that
the object it is about (namely P) exists. This formulation of the puzzle has the assumption that
NE (not that LE) is true.
If TP is true, then E' falsifies NE. E'is a possible truth. Let W be a possible world with respect to
which E'is true. Since E'is true with respect to W, Socrates does not exist in W. By OD, E'does
not exist in W. Since E'does not exist in W, (by EI) T(E) is false with respect to W. Since E'is
true with respect to W, E' and T(E) are not equivalent with respect to W. E' and T(E) are
therefore not necessarily equivalents and NE is false. (Similarly, if TP is true, then the non-
singular negation of any proposition that is singular with respect to a contingent existent is a
counterexample to NE.)
But, if TP is true, then NE seems to be a compelling thesis. Mere material equivalence (sameness
of truth value) as opposed to necessary equivalence between every proposition P and the singular
proposition with respect to P that it is true seems too week a thesis about truth. We want a thesis
that would bring necessity into the picture. I guess the friend of TP might offer a substitute for
NE:
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NS Necessarily, for every proposition P, P and the singular proposition with respect
to P that it is true are equivalent.
In the language of possible worlds, NS says that, for every possible world W, and for every
proposition P that exists in W, P and the singular proposition with respect to P that it is true are
equivalent with respect to W. Note that, even if TP is true, E' does not falsify NS. In the actual
world, we have both E' and T(E) and they are equivalent: E'is false (Socrates does exist) and
T(E) is false: E'is not true. Now consider W' a possible world in which Socrates does not exist.
E'is true with respect to W'and, since E'does not exist in W' T(E) is false with respect to W' E'
and T(E) are therefore not equivalent with respect to W' Still, E'does not falsify NS, because E'
does not exist in W'
In response to the puzzle, one might say that the proposition:
S* It is true that Socrates is wise
is identical with the proposition:
S Socrates is wise.
Call this doctrine the identity doctrine. According to the identity doctrine, although the 'that'-
clause in the sentence 'It is true that Socrates is wise' may appear to be a singular term, it really
is not. In assertively uttering this sentence, we do not refer to the proposition S and predicate
something of it (namely that it is true): we just assert S.
Presumably, this response is not to the effect that, for any proposition P, the singular proposition
with respect to P that it is true is identical with p.12 This would be no objection to the puzzle. If,
12 If, for any proposition P, the singular proposition with respect to P that it is true is identical with P, then all
propositions are singular: every proposition is singular with respect to itself There would still be an important
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for some proposition P, P is true with respect to some possible world in which P does not exist,
then there still is a singular proposition (namely P itself) that does not imply that an object it is
singular with respect to (namely P again) exists. So perhaps we are to infer from the identity
doctrine that, for any proposition P, there is no such proposition as the singular proposition with
respect to P that it is true. But this does not follow. The identity doctrine is compatible with the
thesis that there is such a proposition as the singular proposition with respect to S that it is true,
but that proposition is not expressed by the sentence 'It is true that Socrates is wise'. Maybe
that's what should be said.
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difference, in respect of singularity, between S and the proposition that the philosopher who drank hemlock is wise:
the former is and the latter is not singular with respect to Socrates.
Actualism, Ontological Dependence, and Possible Worlds
1. What There Could Have Been
I never owned a horse. But this is just the way things happened to be; it is certainly possible that I
should have owned a horse. In a sense, it follows that
P It is possible that there should have been something other than anything there
actually is.
It follows because if there is no such object as a horse that belongs to me and it is possible that
there should have been such an object, then it is possible that there should have been something
other than anything there actually is: a horse that belongs to me. Any such horse would have been
an object such that there is actually no such object. This is not to say that it is possible that there
should have been something that would not have existed. Surely, it is a necessary truth that
everything exists. If I had owned a horse, then it would have definitely existed. However, in
another sense P does not follow: any horse-given the right circumstances-is such that it is
possible that it should have been mine.13 If so, then my owning a horse does not require that there
have been something other than anything there actually is: a new object, so to speak.
It is nonetheless possible that there should have been new objects. Consider Bucephalus, the war-
horse of Alexander the Great. Bucephalus might have sired a horse other than any horse that he
13 I could say that any existing horse is such that it is possible that it should have been mine, but this might give the
wrong impression that there are nonexistent horses.
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ever sired. If it is essential to anything that was not sired by Bucephalus that it not be sired by
Bucephalus, then P is true. Note that, for the derivation of P, it does not matter whether
Bucephalus has ever sired a horse. It matters that he might have sired a horse other than any
horse that he ever sired. This is perhaps noteworthy because arguments for P sometimes have
unnecessarily strong presuppositions. For instance, Cartwright says:
Now it is (or seems to me to be, anyhow) essential to everything there is that it is not a sister of mine; yet it
seems to me possible that I should have had a sister; and so it seems to me that it is possible that there should
have been something other than anything there actually is (Cartwright 1997: 82).
For the derivation of P it does not matter that Cartwright has no sister. It matters that it is
possible that he should have had sisters other than any he actually has. This, in conjunction with
the proposition that it is essential to anything that is not a sister of Cartwright's that it not be a
sister of Cartwright's, implies P.
You may have doubts with respect to the proposition that it is essential to anything that was not
sired by Bucephalus that it not be sired by Bucephalus. But even if this proposition is false, P is
probably true. Let's say that a property Q is exclusive if it is essential to anything that does not
have Q that it not have Q. For example, if it is essential to anything that is not a horse sired by
Bucephalus that it not be a horse sired by Bucephalus, then the property of being a horse sired by
Bucephalus is an exclusive property. On the other hand, the property of being a horse that I own
is surely not exclusive. I never owned Bucephalus, but it is possible that I should have owned
him. Let's also say that a property Q is open if it is possible that there should have been objects
that should have had Q, other than the objects that have Q. If Bucephalus might have sired a
horse other than any horse that he had ever sired, then the property of being sired by Bucephalus
is open. Now there probably are properties that are both exclusive and open. If there are, then P is
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true. For if a property Q is open, then it is possible that there should have been something that
should have had Q other than anything that has Q. But if Q is exclusive, then any such object
would not be anything there is, because anything that does not have Q could not have had Q.
To be on firmer grounds with respect to P than considerations of exclusivity allow, one might
want to argue for P from the premise that
(1) It is possible that there should have been more objects than there actually are.
It is a matter of logic alone that, had there been more objects than there actually are, there would
have been something other than anything there actually is. But what might be said in support of
(1)? It may seem that
(2) It is possible that there should have been more horses than there actually are.
It is possible that Bucephalus should have sired more horses than he had ever sired. But (1)
follows only if the property of being sired by Bucephalus is exclusive. Otherwise, horses that
exist actually might have been sired by Bucephalus and the number of horses would not have
increased. So we are back to considerations of exclusivity. Moreover, (2) does not imply (1),
even if the property of being sired by Bucephalus is exclusive. Had Bucephalus sired more horses
than he ever sired, the number of objects would have remained whatever infinite number it is.14
Besides, the consideration of number is too strong. If it is indeed possible that Bucephalus should
have sired more horses than he has ever sired, then the property of being sired by Bucephalus is
open. Again, if it is also exclusive, then P is true.
14 For all we know the universe may be finite, but I suppose that there are sets of physical objects and sets of such
sets etc.
31
2. Actualism
Plantinga argues for the conclusion that if P is true, then according to what he calls the canonical
conception ofpossible worlds (CC) there are nonexistent objects. Plantinga explains what CC is:
Possible worlds themselves are typically 'taken as primitive', as the saying goes: but by way of informal
explanation it may be said that a possible world is a way things could have been-a total way. Among these
ways things could have been there is one-call it 'c'-that has the distinction of being actual; this is the way
things actually are. a is the one possible world that obtains or is actual; the rest are merely possible. Associated
with each possible world W, furthermore, is a set of individuals or objects: the domain of W, which we may call
'y(W)'. The members of y4W) are the objects that exist in W; and of course different objects may exist in
different worlds (Plantinga 1976: 254).
CC includes the following thesis:
D For every possible world W, there is a set y4W)-the domain of W-such that for
every object x, x is a member of r(W) if and only if x exists in W.
U is defined in CC as the union of the domains of all possible worlds: for every object x, x is a
member of U if and only if for some possible world W, x is a member of Vy(W). Plantinga argues
that if P is true, then according to CC there are nonexistent objects:
If [P] is true, then (on the Canonical Scheme) there is a possible world W in which there exists an object
distinct from each of the things that exist in a. ry(W), therefore, contains an object that is not a member of yp(a);
hence the same can be said for U. Accordingly, U contains an object that does not exist in a: this object, then,
does not exist in the actual world and hence does not exist (Plantinga 1976: 256).
Plantinga says here that if P is true, then, on CC,
Pw For some possible world W, there is an object that exists in W and does not exist
in a.
From Pw Plantinga infers that
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(3) There is an object that is a member of y(W) and is not a member of p(a).
The same can be said for U, namely:
(4) There is an object that is a member of U and is not a member of r(a).
By the definition of Vya), (4) implies that
(5) There is a member of U that does not exist in a.
From (5) Plantinga infers that
(6) There is a member of U that does not exist,
and from (6) he infers that
(7) There is an object that does not exist.
Plantinga has an objection:
I believe there neither are nor could have been things that do not exist; the very idea of a nonexistent object is a
confusion, or at best a notion, like that of a square circle, whose exemplification is impossible. In the present
context, however, this remark may beg some interesting questions. Let us say instead that the canonical
conception of possible worlds exacts a substantial ontological toll (Plantinga 1976: 257).
Is the idea of a nonexistent object the idea of an object such that there is no such object? This
would be an idea "whose exemplification is impossible". But if, by way of analyzing P, CC
implied that there are nonexistent objects, then we would not say that CC "exacts a substantial
ontological toll". Rather, we would say that any CC analyst who holds that P is true contradicts
himself. I will argue that a CC analyst who holds that P is true should reject Plantinga's
argument.
Plantinga has the following suggestion:
Suppose we follow Robert Adams... in using the name 'Actualism' to designate the view that there neither are
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nor could be any nonexistent objects (Plantinga 1976: 257).
If there could not be any nonexistent objects, then there are no nonexistent objects. The view
designated here as 'Actualism' is simply that necessarily everything exists. But this view is
unobjectionable! Lewis accepted it. In his theory-a counterpart-theoretic variant of CC-
otherworldly objects do exist:
When we quantify over less than all there is, we leave out things that (unrestrictedly speaking) exist simpliciter
(Lewis 1986: 3).
Yet nobody would call Lewis an actualist. In fact, contrary to Plantinga, Adams is not using the
name 'Actualism' to designate the view that there neither are nor could be any nonexistent
objects. Adams is concerned rather with what he calls Actualism with respect to possible worlds:
...the view that if there are any true statements in which there are said to be nonactual possible worlds, they
must be reducible to statements in which the only things there are said to be are things which there are in the
actual world...(Adams 1974: 202-203).
If this is Actualism with respect to possible worlds, then Actualism (I suppose) is the doctrine
that the only things there are are things which there are in the actual world. Adams says
elsewhere:
Actualism is the doctrine that there are no things that do not exist in the actual world. The actualist agrees, of
course, that there could have been things that do not actually exist; in particular, there could have been
individuals other than those that there are (Adams 1981: 7)
According to Adams, then, Actualism is the doctrine that everything exists in the actual world.
Because it involves the notion of the actual world, the formulation of Actualism as the doctrine
that everything exists in the actual world might give the wrong impression that Actualism
presupposes the possible-worlds analysis of modality. I think you can find the idea that modality
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is susceptible to a possible-worlds analysis objectionable-or avoid the talk of possible worlds
for any other reason-and still be an actualist. I would formulate Actualism as the doctrine:
A Every possible object is an actual object.15
This formulation involves the concept of actuality, rather than the concept of the actual world.
Formulated in terms of possible worlds, Actualism is the doctrine:
A w For every object x and every possible world W, if x exists in W, then x exists in a.
If U is the set of all possible objects, then Actualism is the doctrine:
Au Every member of U exists in a.
Returning to Plantinga's argument, note that (5), in conjunction with Au, implies (6).16 It seems,
then, that Actualism is an implicit premise of Plantinga's argument. But the CC analyst who
holds that P is true must also hold that Actualism is false. The CC analyst interprets subjunctive
quantifiers-phrases such as 'it is possible that there should have been'-as quantifiers over
possible objects that may or may not be actual objects. He would explain that we normally do not
quantify over everything whatever. We only quantify over a certain kind of objects: actual
objects. Thus, when we say of an object that it is (or that it exists), the significance of the
indicative mood is that it restricts us to actual objects. We mean that the object is or exists
actually: in the actual world, that is. The CC analyst proposes that we ignore the normal
significance of the indicative mood and use 'is' in a nonrestrictive or an all-inclusive sense, to
apply to anything whatever. In the nonrestrictive sense, to say of something that it is is to say of it
that it is in actuality or not in actuality. Thus, everything is. For the predicates of the modal
15 Possibilism is the negation of Actualism, namely the doctrine that there are possible objects that are not actual
objects.
16 It might be pointed out that (6) follows from (5) in conjunction with the weaker thesis that every existing member
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language there are, in the language of CC, counterparts that have room for variables and proper
names that range over possible worlds. Thus, for the one-place predicate 'horse' of the modal
language, the language of CC has a two-place counterpart 'horse in'. Statements in which the
mood of a verb is indicative, such as
(8) Bucephalus is a horse
are analyzed as relative to a, the so-called actual world. Thus, (8) is analyzed as:
(8 c) Bucephalus is a horse in a.
Indicative quantifiers-quantifiers that contain a verb in the indicative mood, such as 'there
are'-range over objects that exist in a. The proposition
(9) There are horses
is analyzed in CC as the proposition:
(9 c) There are horses in a.
Similarly, the proposition:
(10) Everything exists
is analyzed in CC as the proposition:
(10c) Every object in a exists in a.
Subjunctive statements are analyzed by means of quantifying over possible worlds and over the
objects that exist in possible worlds. Thus, the CC analyst would take P to be the proposition:
Pc For some world W and some object x, x exists in W and x does not exist in a.
But Pc is the negation of the actualist doctrine A w (a CC analyst who thinks that P is false is
thereby an actualist). The CC analyst who holds that P is true would therefore say that
Plantinga's implicit premise of Actualism is false. He would thus avoid the conclusion that there
of U exists in a. True, but why should one hold the weaker thesis if one were not an actualist?
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are nonexistent objects. 17
It might be said plausibly that the CC analyst who holds that P is true is committed to an idea
whose exemplification is impossible. The CC analyst who holds that P is true is committed to the
doctrine that there are possible objects that are not actual objects. This doctrine is not (or does
not seem to be) a possible truth. However, Plantinga's analogy between non-actual objects and
square circles is not a good analogy, I think. Unlike the idea of a square circle, the idea of a non-
actual object does not seem to involve a contradiction. The idea of a non-actual object is not the
idea of an object such that there is no such object. It is the idea of an object such that there is
such an object, but not in actuality.
3. Ontological Dependence
The possible-worlds actualist-the actualist who accepts the possible-worlds analysis of
modality-is committed to the doctrine:
Ea Every possible world exists in the actual world.
Plantinga commits himself to a stronger doctrine:
Ew Each world exists in each world.
Why should we accept Ew? Even if E, is a necessary truth, Ew does not follow. Plantinga is not
worried:
...each world exists in each world. This may sound excessively Plotinian. What it means, however, is simple
and obvious enough. The actual world, for example (suppose we name it 'c' for ease of reference), is a state of
affairs that obtains. Had some other world been actual, a would not have obtained; still, there would have been
17 Had Plantinga ended the argument with (5), the CC analyst would have accepted it. In saying that P is true, the CC
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such a thing as a; a would have been a merely possible state of affairs (Plantinga 1974: 47).
We might grant that, had some world W obtained, a would have been a merely possible state of
affairs. From here, Plantinga seems to infer that, had W obtained, there would have been such a
world as a. I don't think it follows. I think we can say that a is possible with respect to some
worlds in which it does not exist. Plantinga offers an analogy in support of Ew:
Obtaining or actuality for states of affairs is like truth for propositions. The proposition
[Mll G. Cantor is a mathematician
is true; had things been appropriately different, it would have been false. False, but not non-existent; there
would have been such a proposition, but it would not have been true. In the same way, a obtains. Had things
been different, a would have been a merely possible state of affairs; there would have been such a state of
affairs as a, although that state of affairs would not have been actual (Plantinga 1974: 47).
I am inclined to think that the analogy between obtaining for states of affairs and truth for
propositions works against Plantinga. It suggests that a does not exist in every possible world. I
agree that if Cantor had been a non-mathematician-had he chosen, say, to become a lawyer or a
doctor-M would have been false but not nonexistent. But this does not mean that M would have
existed no matter what. I am inclined to think that had Cantor never existed (or if the field of
Mathematics had never come into being) M would not have existed either. The following
doctrine of ontological dependence seems to hold:
ODp Propositions that are singular with respect to contingent existents depend for their
existence on the existence of their subjects.
Let Ms be a possible state of affairs in which Cantor is a mathematician. If Cantor had not been a
mathematician would there still have been such a state of affairs as Ms? Plantinga would say that
there would. I am not sure. I grant that if Cantor had not been a mathematician, Ms would have
analyst is saying that there are possible objects that do not exist in a.
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been possible. But it does not follow that there would have been such a state of affairs as Ms. I
guess that Plantinga would say that it does follow: if Ms had been possible it would have been, it
is as simple as that-or so his argument might be. It does not seem to me that saying that Ms
would have been possible is saying that Ms would have had the modal property that it is possible
that it should obtain. It seems to mean merely that it would have been possible that Ms should
obtain. Similarly, it might be said that, had Cantor not existed, he would have been a possible
object. But this does not mean that there would have been such an object as Cantor, an object that
would have had the modal property of being an object x such that it is possible that x should be.
Rather, it seems to mean merely that it would have been possible that Cantor should be. Even if
Ms would have existed had Cantor failed to be a mathematician, the question is whether it is
necessary that Ms should exist. As with the corresponding proposition M, I am inclined to think
that it is not necessary. Here too, it seems to me that had Cantor never existed, the state of affairs
Ms would not only not have obtained, it would not have existed. My inclinations in the case of
the proposition and in the case of the state of affairs are similar because in both cases it seems to
me that we are dealing with objects that depend for their existence on the existence of Cantor.
A mere analogy between obtaining for states of affairs and truth for propositions should not make
one endorse Ew. But Plantinga offers more than an analogy. First, he observes that
In semantical developments of modal logic, one meets the suggestion that a possible world may be possible
relative to some but perhaps not all possible worlds. To say that W is possible relative to W' is to say that W
would have been possible if W'had been actual; alternatively, it is to say that every proposition true in W is
possible in W' or that every state of affairs that obtains in W is possible in W'(Plantinga 1974: 51).
He then goes on to argue that the relation of possibility in what he calls the broad logical sense
holds between all possible worlds. Even so, I do not see why a world V should exist in a world W
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if V is possible relative to W. Perhaps for the following reason. If V is possible relative to W, any
proposition that is true in V is possible in W. But what is it for a proposition to be true or possible
in a world? According to Plantinga,
To say that p is true in a world W is to say that if W had been actual, p would have been true (Plantinga 1974:
46).
Similarly, I guess, to say that P is possible in a world W is to say that had W obtained, P would
have been possible. If so, then since V is possible relative to W, for any proposition P, if P would
have been true had V obtained, then P would have been possible had W obtained. At this point
Plantinga might argue as follows. Let Q be the singular proposition with respect to V that it is
actual. Had V obtained, Q would have been true. Since V is possible relative to W, had W
obtained, Q would have been possible. But had Q been possible it would have existed, but then-
since Q is singular with respect to V-V would also have existed. V therefore exists in W.
This argument has what seems to be the false presupposition that a proposition is possible only
with respect to worlds in which it exists. A reason for having this presupposition might be the
thought that, when we say of a proposition P that it is possible with respect to a world W, we say
something to the effect that P has a modal property in W, the property of being a possible truth.' 8
This would imply that P exists in W, as having a property in a world requires existence in it. I
think that what we say rather has the effect that P actually has a modal property: P is actually
such that, had W obtained, P would have been possible. Having this property actually does not
imply that P exists in W; it implies that P exists in the actual world. Call worlds in which Cantor
18 A reason for having this thought might simply be a confusion concerning the scope of 'in W'. One might not
distinguish between having (in a) the property of being-a-possible-truth-in- W and having in W the property of being-
a-possible-truth.
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does not exist cantorless worlds.19 Let Wc be a cantorless world. Suppose we say that M would
have been possible had Wc obtained. This does not mean that M has in We the modal property of
being a possible truth. M does not even exist in Wc, so it does not have any properties in it,
modal or not modal. Still, M has (in the actual world) the modal property that it would have been
possible had Wc obtained.
Plantinga's considerations in favor of Ew were based on an analogy between states of affairs and
propositions, and on the universality of the possibility relation between possible worlds. I found
these considerations to be unconvincing.2 0 Another consideration in favor of Ew---a consideration
that Plantinga would not offer-is that the possible-worlds analysis together with plausible
doctrines of ontological dependence require that Ew be true. In the possible worlds analysis,
modal operators such as 'it is possible that' are interpreted as quantifiers over possible worlds.
Thus, the proposition:
PM It is possible that Cantor should be a mathematician
is analyzed as:
PMw There is a possible world in which Cantor is a mathematician.
One might think that PM and:
E' It is false that Cantor exists.
are compossible. E'implies the negation of M, not that it is impossible that M be true. Now if PM
and E' are compossible, then PM is true with respect to some cantorless worlds. Let Wc be such a
19 Being a cantorless world is a property that worlds have essentially, if they have it at all.
20 Plantinga cannot consistently argue for Ew on the ground that possible worlds are abstract and therefore necessary
existents. He recognizes that sets (presumably abstract entities) that have contingent existents as members are
themselves contingent existents. For example, he says (1976: 260): "Quine's singleton, for example, could not have
existed if Quine had not. For from the actualist point of view, if Quine had not existed, there would have been no
such object as Quine at all, in which case there would have been nothing for Quine's singleton to contain."
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world. If PM and PMw are equivalent, then PMw is also true with respect to Wc. Call worlds in
which Cantor is a mathematician M worlds. It seems to follow that there is an M world in Wc.
The reason for that is that when we evaluate quantified statements in terms of possible-worlds,
we let quantifiers range over objects that exist in the world of evaluation. Thus, we say that it is
true with respect to a world W that there are talking donkeys just in case there are talking donkeys
in W. If so, then there is an M world in Wc-or so it seems.
But the OD theorist would say that Mworlds depend ontologically on Cantor. Suppose we are in
a cantorless world and we want to say what must be the case in order for a to obtain (a is an M
world). a is a possibility that is not qualitative with respect to Cantor: for a to obtain, Cantor
himself-not just anybody who resembles him-must be a mathematician. If so, then to say what
must be the case in order for a to be obtain, we should say of M that it must be true. But ODp
implies that M does not exist in cantorless worlds. If so, then there are no M worlds in Wc. The
OD theorist says that there are no M worlds in Wc while the possible-worlds analysis seems to
require that there be M worlds in Wc. It seems that the possible-worlds analysis is unavailable to
the OD theorist.
I do not think that this consideration shows that the possible-worlds analysis requires that there
be M worlds in We. But first, isn't the OD theorist contradicting himself? How could it be
possible in Wc that Cantor should be a mathematician if there are no Mworlds in Wc? This is not
a contradiction, I think. When we analyze modality in terms of possible worlds, we consider truth
as a relation between propositions and worlds: a proposition P is true with respect to a world W,
if P would have been true had W obtained. The principal doctrine of the possible-worlds analysis
is:
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WA A proposition is possibly true just in case it is true with respect to some possible
world.
To analyze modality in terms of the relation of truth between propositions and worlds is not to
deny that truth is a property that some propositions have in worlds in which they exist. A
proposition P is true in a world W in which it exists just in case P is true with respect to W. It
seems to me that to suggest an alternative to WA according to which a proposition is possibly true
just in case it is true in a world in which it exists would be to rule out a conceptual possibility. It
is that a proposition might be both essentially false (false in every possible world in which it
exists) and a possible truth. The OD theorist would say that this conceptual possibility is realized
by negations of existential propositions that are singular with respect to contingent existents. E'is
true with respect to every cantorless world. If E' depends for its existence on the existence of
Cantor, then E'requires its own nonexistence for its truth. E' is therefore essentially false and a
possible truth. Now WA lends itself to a generalization:
WA* A proposition is possibly true with respect to a world Wjust in case it is true with
respect to a world that is possible with respect to W.
Thus, when we analyze modality in terms of possible worlds, we consider possibility as a relation
between worlds. We subscribe to WA * as opposed to the doctrine that a possibility statement is
true with respect to a given world if it is true with respect to worlds that have the property of
possibility in the world of evaluation. We see that to say that it is possible in Wc that Cantor
should be a mathematician is not to commit to the existence in We of a world that has (in Wc)
both the property of being possible and the property of being an Mworld. It is to commit rather to
the actual existence of an Mworld that is possible with respect to We. We should therefore reject
the inference from the thesis that there are no M worlds in We to the conclusion that PM is false
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with respect to Wc. Since it is not part of the OD theorist's position that there should be no M
worlds that are possible with respect to cantorless worlds, it does not follow that the possible-
worlds analysis is not available to the OD theorist.
4. Unexemplified Essences
Plantinga argues for the conclusion that the possible-worlds actualist who holds that P is true has
to appeal to essences:
... the domain of any possible world W, from the actualist perspective, is a subset of y(a). Since there are no
objects distinct from those that exist in a, y(W) cannot contain an object distinct from each that exists in a. Of
course the actualist will happily concede that there could have been an object distinct from any that exists in a.
Hence there is a possible world W in which there exists an object distinct from any that actually exists. The
actualist must hold, therefore, that )(W) is a subset of p(a)-despite the fact that W includes the existence of
an object that does not exist in a. How can this be managed? How can the actualist understand
[P] There could have been an object distinct from each object that actually exists
if he holds that r(W), for any W, is a subset of y(a)? ... Easily enough; he must appeal to essences (Plantinga
1976: 268).
Plantinga explains later:
How then shall we understand [P]? Easily enough; [P] is true if and only if there is a world where
(34) there is an object that does not exist in a
is true. But (34) is true in a world W if and only if there is an essence that is exemplified in W but not in a. [P]
is true, therefore, if and only if there is at least one essence that is exemplified in some world but not
exemplified in fact-if and only if, that is, there is an unexemplified essence (Plantinga 1976: 272).
A question that may be of some importance is what precisely might the appeal to essences
accomplish. This is not made clear in Plantinga's text.
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Actualism is compatible with P. Actualism is also compatible with the conjunction of P and
D For every possible world W, there is a set /4(W)-the domain of W-such that for
every object x, x is a member of 4(W) if and only if x exists in W.
Actualism, in conjunction with D, implies
A, For any possible world W, q4W) is a subset of (a).
It follows that P is compatible with A,. The actualist does not have to appeal to essences in order
to reconcile P with A,
It may seem that the actualist has to reconcile
Pw For some possible world W, there is an object that exists in W and does not exist
in a.
with A, How could there be, in some world W, an object that does not exist in a if, for every
world W, every object that exists in W also exists in a? It seems to me that the actualist does not
have to appeal to essences to solve this problem either. But first, to see whether essences could
be of any help, the problem must be formulated in terms of essences through and through.
Plantinga's:
PE For some essence E and some possible world W, E is exemplified in W and E is
not exemplified in a.
must be reconciled with a reformulation of Actualism in terms of essences. The burden of
reconciliation rests on Plantinga. To reformulate Actualism in terms of essences, Plantinga can
say that an essence is exemplified just in case there is an object that exemplifies it. Reformulated
in terms of essences, Actualism is the doctrine:
AE For every essence E, ifE is exemplified, then E is exemplified in a.
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Reconciling PE with AE might not be easier than reconciling Pw with A,. How could an essence
be exemplified in some world but not in a, when every exemplified essence is exemplified in a?
PE and AE imply in conjunction that
(11) For some essence E and some world W, E is exemplified in W and E is not
exemplified.
(11) calls for an explanation. Plantinga is not off the hook yet.
Plantinga might say that if an essence is not exemplified in a, then it is not exemplified at all,
because every exemplified essence is exemplified in a-proposition AE. But then how could an
essence be exemplified in some world but not in a? To proceed, Plantinga might say that an
essence E is exemplified in a world Wjust in case there is in W an object that exemplifies E in
W.21 Thus, an essence is exemplified in some world but not in a (and therefore not exemplified)
just in case it is exemplified in some world by an object that does not exist in a. Well yes, but
how could there be, in some world, an object that does not exist in a-proposition Pw-when
everything exists in a-proposition A ,? This attempt to reconcile PE and AE presupposes both Pw
and AV, We can accept this as an explanation only if we can reconcile Pw with A,. But this is
what we set out to do in the first place. Essences seem to be of no help.
I think it might be possible to reconcile PE with AE without reverting to Pw and A,. The actualist
can say that an essence E is exemplified in a world W just in case E would have been exemplified
had W obtained. Thus, (11) is equivalent to:
21 The exemplifying object has to exist in W. Let W be a world in which there are only humans that do not exist in a.
We want to say that the property of being human is exemplified in W even though, for every object x, it is not the
case that x is human in W. Furthermore, the property has to be exemplified by the object in the world. Socrates
exists in worlds in which there are no philosophers. He does not exemplify the property of being a philosopher in
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(11') For some W and some E, had W obtained, E would have been exemplified, and
(actually) E is not exemplified.
The seeming contradiction in (11) is dissolved. An essence that is exemplified in some world
need not be exemplified: it would have been exemplified had the world obtained, but it need not
be exemplified if the world does not obtain. PE with AE are thus reconciled.
This explanation could serve Plantinga but it suggests a way to reconcile Pw with A, without
appealing to essences. The actualist could avoid the appeal to essences if he explained what he
thinks it is for objects of some kind (say, talking donkeys) to exist in a given possible world. If
we knew that, we might be able to assess the ontological commitment that is involved in an
actualist assertion of Pw. If it turned out that, in asserting Pw, the actualist is not committed to the
existence of non-actual objects, then Pw is in no conflict with the actualist thesis A,. The
actualist might explain that there are talking donkeys in a world Wjust in case, had W obtained,
there would have been talking donkeys. It seems that, in asserting that there are talking donkeys
in W, there is no ontological commitment on the part of the actualist, to objects with the modal
property that they would have been talking donkeys had W obtained. The absence of such a
commitment is conveyed by the subjunctive mood of the actualist's quantifier: the actualist is not
saying that there are any objects of some kind, he is only saying that there would have been
objects of some kind had W obtained.22 We can now assess the ontological commitment that is
involved in the actualist's assertion of Pw. According to the Actualist understanding of existence
in possible worlds, Pw is the thesis that, for some world W, had W obtained there would have
those worlds, even though he is a philosopher.
22 In contrast with this explanation, a CC analyst would say that there are talking donkeys in W just in case, for some
object x, x is a talking donkey in W. The CC analyst is thus ontologically committed to objects that are talking
donkeys in W. This is straightforwardly suggested by the plain existential quantification over objects: 'for some
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existed an object other than any object that exists in a. In asserting Pw, the actualist does not
commit himself to the existence of anything that does not exist in a. The reason for that is that
existential quantification carries no ontological commitment when it is in the subjunctive mood.
The actualist in not saying that there are objects that exist in some possible worlds but not in a.
He is saying rather that there would have been objects that do not exist in a had some worlds
obtained. Thus, from an actualist standpoint, Pw concerns objects there might have been, not
objects that, in some non-modal sense of the word 'are', are. The actualist does not have to
appeal to essences in order to reconcile Pw with A , because they are compatible. 23
The appeal to essences is meant to accomplish something other than the reconciliation of Pw with
A ,, I think. An actualist who holds that P is true cannot quantify over the domains of possible
worlds if the domains of possible worlds are thought of as the sets of objects that exist in each
world: Actualism implies A V and the analysis would yield that P is false. If the actualist could
replace the domain function qy of CC with a function that assigns to each world the set of
essences that are exemplified in it, he would be able to deny that the domains are subsets of the
domain of ca. He would then have a substitute for his suspicious sounding subjunctive
explanation of existence in a world, and he would be able to mimic the reductive analysis of CC
by quantifying, not only over possible worlds, but also over members of their domains.
To populate the domains with essences, an actualist would have to assume that:
(12) Necessarily, every object has an actual essence.
object'.
23 The actualist would reject Pc as an analysis of P. He would say that you couldn't analyze a true statement such as
P by existentially quantifying over non-actual objects because there are no such objects to quantify over. For the
actualist, the analysis should have the inverse direction, if at all. He might tolerate existential quantification over
non-actual objects, as long as he does not have to take it at face value. Pc must be viewed as literally false, he would
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In conjunction with P, (12) implies the worrisome doctrine:
UE There are unexemplified essences.
Some might argue for (12) from the conjunction of:
NE Necessarily, every object has essence.
and
(13) Necessarily, every essence is a necessary existent.
Perhaps friends of essences would take NE for granted. I guess that Plantinga would not have too
much trouble with (13) either. He says:
Socrates is a contingent being; his essence, however, is not. Properties, like propositions and possible worlds,
are necessary beings. If Socrates had not existed, his essence would have been unexemplified, but not
nonexistent (Plantinga 1976: 268).
ODp is a plausible doctrine of ontological dependence. It implies that propositions that are
singular with respect to the contingent existent Socrates depend for their existence on the
existence of Socrates. The following also seems to be a plausible doctrine of ontological
dependence:
ODE Essences of contingent existents depend for their existence on the existence of
their objects.
ODE implies that if Socrates has an essence, then that essence depends for its existence on the
existence of Socrates. If so, then it is impossible that an essence of Socrates be unexemplified. I
guess that Plantinga would say that the analogy with singular propositions undermines the
doctrine that the essence of Socrates depends ontologically on Socrates. Plantinga says that
propositions are necessary beings.
say, and as non-literally true only because it can be understood as the true modal statement Pw.
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Populating the domains of possible worlds with essences is a way for the actualist to reconcile P
with the possible-worlds analysis of modality. There may be other ways. Stalnaker says:
Whatever the fate of Plantinga's particular theory of individual essences, the general point is difficult to avoid.
Any actualist who accepts the intuitively very plausible thesis that there might have been individuals other than
those that actually exist will need to distinguish in some way between individuals in the strict sense and their
representatives in the domains of the possible worlds (Stalnaker 1986: 129).
I agree, but it is hard for me to see how the fate of Plantinga's particular theory of individual
essences is different from the fate of Stalnaker's particular theory of possible worlds.
5. Possible Worlds
Metaphysicians of modality commonly take our pre-philosophical tendency to move back and
forth between idioms of modality and idioms of quantification over possibilities to license a
paraphrase of statements of modality as statements of quantification over possible worlds (Lewis
1973: 84). Whether you are an actualist or a possibilist, if you think that modality is susceptible
to a possible-worlds analysis, or if you take literally the seemingly less committal possible-
worlds paraphrases that only explicitly quantify over possible worlds and actual objects, then you
would have to say what you think possible worlds are.
What could the possibilist's possible worlds be like? Stalnaker (an actualist) says:
Other possible worlds, according to the possibilist, are concrete universes, spatially and temporally
disconnected from our own, but just as real (Stalnaker 1986: 121).
Lewis is a possibilist who thinks that possible worlds are concrete universes. In Lewis's theory
(1986: 198), worlds do not have parts in common. But I do not think that every possibilist who
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analyzes modality in terms of possible worlds has to have this view. Consider a CC analyst who
is also a possibilist because he thinks that P is true. What prevents him from adopting Stalnaker's
view of possible worlds as ways the world might have been? In fact, I think it would be hard for
CC analysts to maintain that possible worlds are disjoint concrete universes. Consider the
proposition:
(14) Cantor is in fact a mathematician, but he could have been a doctor.
In CC, (14) is analyzed as the proposition:
(14 c) Cantor is a mathematician in a and, for some world W other than a, Cantor is a
doctor in W.
But in CC, it is the actual objects themselves-not their counterparts or representatives-that
exist (beside merely possible objects, perhaps) in other possible worlds. Since one cannot be a
mathematician or a doctor without existing, (14 c) implies in CC that Cantor exists in a world
other than a, as well as in a. But here is a question that CC is silent about: is Cantor scattered
among the different worlds in which he exists, or does he exist as a whole in each of them? If he
exists as a whole in every world in which he exists, then (14 c) implies that Cantor exists as a
whole in more than one possible world. But if so, then possible worlds are not disjoint concrete
universes. CC analysts can say that possible worlds are disjoint concrete universes only if they
are also willing to say that Cantor has proper parts in different worlds. This would be an
incredible thing to say. It is not only a small part of Cantor that exists actually; it is the whole
man.
Modality can be compared and contrasted with space and with time with respect to two
metaphysical perspectives. One perspective is ontological: Does everything exist locally, so to
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speak? Regarding modality the question is whether everything exists actually. Regarding time it
is whether everything exists now and regarding space it is whether everything exists here. The
second metaphysical perspective pertains to the existence in whole or in part of physical objects
such as human beings. Do we wholly exist actually or do we have parts that are merely possible?
Do we wholly exist now or do we have parts that exist in the past or in the future? Are we wholly
or only partly here? There seems to hold a logical connection between the two perspectives. If
everything exists actually, then I do not have merely possible parts. If everything exists now, then
I do not have temporal parts that exist in the past or in the future. If everything exists here, then I
do not have parts in other places. This seems to be the only logical connection between the two
perspectives in question. Regarding modality, for example, I hold that everything exists actually,
so I must hold that I do not have merely possible parts. But I might have held that, although it is
not possible that there should be human beings that would have merely possible parts, it is
possible that there should be objects that would be merely possible. Or I might have held yet a
different opinion: I might have held that I do not exist wholly in the actual world and that,
therefore, some objects (proper parts of mine) are merely possible objects. This would be an
incredible though possible position to hold. Now Stalnaker says:
If you think of time as space-like, then you will think of continuant individuals-persons and physical
objects-as extended through time in the same way that they are extended through space. We are the same as
our histories. Only a part of you exists now; other temporal parts are past, or yet to come (Stalnaker 1986: 134).
But you can also think of time as space-like in the "ontological localism" respect but not as
space-like in the whole-part respect. You can think of modality, of time and of space as different
from each other when it comes to the two metaphysical perspectives in question. With respect to
the ontological question, you can think of modality as different both from time and from space.
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You can think that everything exists actually and be a realist with respect to past and future
objects, just as you can be a realist with respect to objects that exist elsewhere. With respect to
the whole-part perspective, one can think of modality and time as different from space. One can
think of people as existing as wholes whenever they exist, just as they would have existed wholly
had they been different from the way they are. On the other hand, you can still say that different
parts of each person occupy different regions in space.
What could the actualist's possible worlds be like? In Stalnaker's view, the world we are all part
of and possible worlds are objects of different kinds. The world we are all part of is a physical
universe and possible worlds-the actual world among them-are ways the world might have
been, complex properties that the whole physical universe might have exemplified. But does the
phrase 'the world' in "ways the world might have been" denote the same physical universe, the
universe we are in fact part of, with respect to every possible world? In other words: is every
possible world a way the actual physical universe might have been? Some possible worlds may
plausibly be thought of as ways the actual physical universe might have been, but I do not think
that Stalnaker is committed to the view that any possible world is a way this world might have
been. Possible worlds are complex properties that any physical universe might have exemplified:
'the world' denotes, with respect to any possible world W, the concrete universe that would have
existed had W obtained. This would be a plausible reading as Stalnaker speaks interchangeably of
possible worlds as ways the world might have been and as ways things might have been. A
possible world with respect to which P is true is a way some non-actual things (among actual
things, perhaps) might have been. So perhaps by 'things' Stalnaker means things that might have
existed, the totality of which might constitute a complete physical universe.
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It may seem that possible worlds are available to the actualist, at least in a limited way, without
forcing him to appeal to essences. The actualist can say what it is for a proposition to be true with
respect to a possible world without appealing to essences. He can say what it is for a property to
be exemplified in a possible world without appealing to essences. The actualist can also say what
it is for a particular (actual) object to exemplify a property in a possible world without appealing
to essences. Thus, Cantor exemplifies the property of being a mathematician in a world Wjust in
case had W obtained there would have been such a mathematician as Cantor. It seems that only if
he chooses to take the further step of replacing all modal idioms with idioms of quantification
that the actualist should appeal to essences so that he have objects to populate the domains of
possible worlds with. This is an illusion, I suspect. It seems to me that the actualist must appeal
to essences if he wants to say that there are possible worlds.
The conjunction of P and NE implies:
PE It is possible that there should have been an essence that actually no object
exemplifies.
If Bucephalus had sired a horse other than any horse that he ever sired, then the essence of any
such new horse would have been an essence that actually no object exemplifies. PE presupposes
NE but it is otherwise inoffensive. PE does not imply that there are any unexemplified essences.
Nor does it imply that it is possible that there should have been unexemplified essences: essence
that would have been unexemplified. Moreover, PE is consistent with Actualism: it does not
imply that there are any non-actual essences. But now, the actualist who is committed to the
existence of possible worlds is committed to the doctrine that every possible world is an actual
object. If possible worlds are complex properties, then they are actual complex properties-or so
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the actualist must say. It seems that any possible world with respect to which P is true is a
possible world that has an essence that actually no object exemplifies as a constituent. If possible
worlds have their constituent properties essentially and they are all actual objects, then there are
actual essences that no actual object exemplifies: there are unexemplified essences after all! It
thus seems that the actualist is committed to the extravagant ontology of unexemplified essences
not only in order to reconcile Actualism with the possible-worlds analysis but also in order to
reconcile Actualism with the doctrine that there are possible worlds.
Furthermore, the actualist who is committed to the existence of possible worlds must reject ODE.
PE, in conjunction with ODE, implies
P* It is possible that there should have been an essence other than any essence there
actually is.24
P* is consistent with Actualism, but if P* is true and possible worlds have their constituent
properties essentially, then some possible worlds are not actual objects. This would not be
consistent with Actualism. This problem carries over to other theories of possible worlds that
purport to be consistent with Actualism. Adams (1974: 204) suggests that a possible world is the
set of propositions that would have been true had the world obtained. Let W be a possible world
24 It is plausible that there might have been qualitative properties that do not actually exist. When we deny that the
property of being red is exemplified in a possible world W what we say might be true in two different ways. First, the
property of being red might exist in W yet nothing in W would be red. If we managed to eliminate all instances of
redness in the universe by destroying red objects or painting them green all over, it would be strange to say that with
the elimination of the very last instance of redness, the property of being red would also cease to exist. There would
still be such property to speak of, it seems, but it would exist unexemplified. The other way in which it might not be
the case that the property of being red is exemplified in a possible world W, is that the property itself would not exist
in W. Consider the possible state of affairs in which the physical laws were always different so that there never was
such a phenomenon as electromagnetic radiation. In this case it seems that, not only there would have been no red
objects, there would have been no such property as the property of being red. Now if in the actual physical universe
there are qualitative properties that would not exist in other concrete universes, then perhaps there might have been
concrete universes in which there would have been qualitative properties that do not exist in the actual physical
universe.
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in which Bucephalus sires a horse other than any horse that he ever sired. Had W obtained, there
would have been, with respect to any such new horse, a true singular proposition that would have
predicated of that particular horse that it is a horse. But if ODp is true, then any such proposition
would have depended ontologically on the horse it would have been about, and would have been
such that actually there is no such proposition: it would have been a new true proposition! The
set of all true propositions that would have existed, had W obtained, is therefore not an actual set.
If that set is identical with W, then W does not exist actually.
One might take this consideration to undermine doctrines of ontological dependence such as ODE
and ODp: one can always insist that, while Bucephalus's new offspring is not an actual object,
his essence is an actual object. But the actualist for whom doctrines of ontological dependence
are dear would rather say that theories of possible worlds are irreconcilable with Actualism. He
would have to relinquish not only the possible worlds analysis of modality but also the literal
understanding of the seemingly less committal modal possible-worlds scheme of paraphrase.
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Possibilism and the Nature ofActuality
I On What Possibilism Actually Isn't
There is controversy among metaphysicians of modality. Possibilists say that actual (or realized)
objects do not exhaust the totality of everything there is. Reality, they say, consists of objects that
are merely possible (or potential), as well as of actual objects. Actualists disagree. Reality and
actuality, they say, are one and the same.
One may wonder what the fuss is all about. It may seem obvious that the controversial thesis
P There are possible objects that are not actual
is false. It is false (I think), but note that P is not the thesis:
C There are possible objects that do not exist.
C is a contradiction. It entails that there are objects that do not exist, which is Meinong's
notorious thesis:
M There are objects of which it is true to say that there are no such objects. 25
M is a contradiction, if anything is. On the other hand, the possibilist thesis P is (or at least seems
to be) a coherent ontological thesis.
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If one fails to appreciate the distinction between P and C, then one's attempts to refute P might
amount to no more than a futile attack on what is a blatant contradiction, namely C. In this
section I illustrate this claim. I argue that the distinction between P and C has eluded Plantinga.
Plantinga has formulated an argument that may appear to be for the possibilist thesis P and then
detected a fallacy in it. But the argument is in fact for the contradiction C. Or at least, the
argument involves the fallacy only if it is interpreted as an argument for C.2 6
1
In chapters VII and VIII of The Nature ofNecessity, Plantinga argues against the thesis:
C There are possible objects that do not exist.
He says:
[A] possible object that does not exist... is a thing such that there exists no such thing, to paraphrase
Meinong-a monumentally perplexing idea (Plantinga 1974: 132).
This does not appear to be an argument against the thesis:
P There are possible objects that are not actual.
Plantinga is not pointing to an alleged modal distinction (say, between being and existence) and
saying of that distinction that it is objectionable. If one merely paraphrases Meinong when one
says that there is an object such that there exists no such object, then one does not posit any
objects of dubious (presumably modal) status. One is asserting a contradiction, namely M. On the
25 This is a quote from Meinong (1904: 83).
26 Language doesn't make it easy to appreciate the distinction between P and C. The words 'There are possible
objects that do not exist' formulate P, not C, if the mood of the word 'exist' conveys actuality and the mood of the
quantifier 'there are' does not convey actuality. One might want to use the adverb 'actually' to mark the difference
between P and C: P would be the thesis that there are possible objects that do not actually exist and C would be the
thesis that there are possible objects that do not (simply) exist. It seems to me that, for people who do not already
have a grip on P, it would be hard to see what work the word 'actually' would do here: they would wonder how there
could be any objects that would exist but not actually exist. I prefer to formulate P as the thesis that some possible
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other hand, when one says that there is an object that is not actual, one does not assert M. One
says, rather, that there is an object x such that, in actuality, no object is x. In the language of
possible worlds, one says that there is an object x such that, for every object y in the actual world,
x is not y. This is not (or does not seem to be) Meinong's thesis.
Plantinga proceeds to consider what he takes to be an argument for C:
[I]n other possible worlds there must be... objects that are distinct from anything that exists in cx. And in saying
that there are possible but nonexistent objects, we do no more than call attention to these objects.
Suppose we concede the argument's premises: in some possible world there exist objects distinct from any
that exist in ca. The studied vagueness of its conclusion may leave us perplexed. Is the claim only that there
could have been objects distinct from any that exist in cx? This is no doubt so; but it seems excessively dramatic
to put this point by saying that there are some possible but nonexistent objects. Is the claim instead to be taken
literally as the suggestion that there really are some things that do not exist? Then the concluding step seems
totally unwarranted (Plantinga 1974: 132).27
The argument that Plantinga considers has a single premise:
(1) It is possible that there should have been something other than anything there
actually is. 2 8
The conclusion of the argument is C.2 9 I grant that (1) does not entail C. But, instead of the
relationship between (1) and C, consider the relationship between (1) and P. There is a stance
toward modality according to which (1) and P are the same proposition. Reductionism-as I shall
objects are not actual. It seems to me that the use of the adjective 'actual' suggests that the thesis under consideration
is not a contradiction.
27 Plantinga uses the Greek letter 'a' as a proper name of the actual world.
28 The formulation of(1) in terms of possible worlds (as in the quotation from Plantinga) is not required. (1) seems to
be true. Consider Bucephalus, the war-horse of Alexander the great. Bucephalus might have sired a horse other than
any horse that he ever sired. If it is essential to anything that is not a horse sired by Bucephalus that it not be a horse
sired by Bucephalus, then (1) is true.
29 The first candidate that Plantinga considers (in the quotation) for being the conclusion of the argument-the claim
that there could have been objects distinct from any that exist in a-is surely not the conclusion of the argument: it is
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call this stance-says that possible truth is truth about possible things. According to the
reductionist, the thesis that it is possible that there should have been talking donkeys is the thesis
that there are talking donkeys. Lewis was a reductionist. He held the view that many donkeys-
albeit otherworldly-do indeed talk! If you insisted, "There are no talking donkeys," then Lewis
would say that you speak truly only if your quantifiers are duly restricted. According to the
reductionist, the thesis that it is possible that there should have been objects other than anything
there actually is-proposition (1--is the thesis that there are possible objects that are not
actual-proposition P. (Note that a reductionist need not be a possibilist: one could maintain that
(1) and P are the same false proposition.) Bringing Reductionism to bear on (1) might make one
grasp P, but Plantinga does not do that. Instead, he considers an argument from (1) to C. This
supports my thesis that Plantinga fails to appreciate the distinction between P and C. This thesis
is corroborated as one proceeds to read Plantinga's text.
2
Plantinga goes on to say that C has a history in Philosophy. This would be strange. C is an
obvious contradiction; it does not merit much attention. According to Plantinga, G. E. Moore
formulated an argument for C. Plantinga quotes Moore:
... it seems as if purely imaginary things, even though they be absolutely self-contradictory like a round square,
must still have some kind of being-must still be in a sense-simply because we can think and talk about them.
... And now in saying that there is no such thing as a round square, I seem to imply that there is such a thing. It
seems as if there must be such a thing, merely in order that it may have the property of not being. It seems,
therefore, as if to say of anything whatever that we can mention that it absolutely is not, were to contradict
ourselves: as if absolutely everything we can mention must be, must have some kind of being (Plantinga 1974:
the premise of the argument, namely (1).
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133).30
Call this argument MA. Plantinga seems to be misinterpreting Moore. The conclusion of MA is
not that the modal contradiction C (or that P, for that matter) is a possible truth.3 ' MA has the
non-modal conclusion that imaginary objects have being, that there are such things. MA is
basically this. We think about imaginary objects. Anything that we think about has being.
Therefore: Imaginary objects have being. That's it. No modality! Not in the premises and not in
the conclusion. 32
Intending to give another example of an argument for C in the history of Philosophy, Plantinga
quotes Russell:
Being is that which belongs to every conceivable term, to every possible object of thought-in short to
everything that can possibly occur in any proposition, true or false, and to all such propositions themselves.
Being belongs to whatever can be counted. If A be any term that can be counted as one, it is plain that A is
something, and therefore that A is. "A is not" must always be either false or meaningless. For ifA were nothing,
it could not be said not to be; "A is not" implies that there is a term A whose being is denied, and hence that A
is. Thus unless "A is not" be an empty sound, it must be false-whatever A may be, it certainly is. Numbers, the
Homeric gods, relations, chimeras and four-dimensional spaces all have being, for if they were not entities of a
kind, we could make no propositions about them. Thus being is a general attribute of everything, and to
mention anything is to show that it is (Russell 1937: 449).
It seems that Plantinga is also misinterpreting Russell. Like Moore, Russell is not advocating
some kind of modal thesis. Russell is arguing for the conclusion that any meaningful denial of
being is false. If it is meaningful to say that Pegasus is not, then there is an object whose being is
30 The quote is from Moore (1953: 289). The quote in Plantinga's text is (insignificantly) inaccurate. I quoted
directly from Moore.
31 C is a modal thesis: it says that there are possible objects that do not exist.
32 The language of MA is modal, but needlessly so. If we omit the word 'can' from "simply because we can think and
talk about them," we still have an argument to the same effect. Note that Moore does not accept MA: see Moore
(1953: 291).
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denied: Pegasus is, after all.33
Plantinga says that the argument for C "gains strength" when we turn to singular propositions:
Consider Socrates, for example; he exists in the actual world but not in every world. That is, there are possible
worlds in which Socrates does not exist. Let W be such a world: had W obtained, then
[(2)] Socrates does not exist
and
[(3)] Possibly Socrates exists
would have been true. Had W obtained, therefore,
[C] There is at least one nonexistent possible object
would have been true (Plantinga 1974: 135,136).
Call this argument PA. I don't think that PA is a valid argument. 34 I cannot see how the
conjunction of (2) and (3) entails C. Why should there be a (possible) nonexistent object, if
Socrates does not exist? Surely the possibility that Socrates should exist does not do the trick. On
the other hand, MA is valid. If we think about, say, Pegasus, and anything that we think about has
being, then Pegasus has being. Now if PA is not valid and MA is valid, how could PA be any
stronger than MA?
3
According to Plantinga, one might propound the following reasoning in favor of PA:
No doubt existence is not an ordinary property; perhaps it does not much resemble such properties as being red
or being six feet tall. Still, it is a property of some sort. And if it is, then it must have a complement-there must
33 You might say that Pegasus is, all right, but it is a mythical object, not a real object. My response would be that
reality consists of everything whatever. If Pegasus is not a real object, then there is no such object.
34 PA might be dismissed too easily. It is said in it of Socrates that he exists in the actual world. That is not true.
Socrates drank hemlock in 399 BC. Consequently, he ceased to exist in the actual world. If he was not resurrected
since then, then Socrates does not exist in the actual world. The response to this kind of objection should be that we
leave time out of our considerations altogether. When we say that Socrates exists (present tense) we do not mean that
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be a property P such that x has P if and only if x does not exist. Now [(2)] is the false proposition that Socrates
has that property; it is a singular proposition that predicates of Socrates the property of nonexistence. [(2)] is in
fact false; but if W had obtained, it would have been true. If W had obtained, Socrates would not have existed;
still, there would have been a true proposition that was both about him and predicated a property of him. But
how could there be a true proposition about Socrates-in particular one predicating a property of him-in W if,
in W, he had no kind of being or ontological status at all (Plantinga 1974: 136)?
This explanation has the conclusion that M, not C, is a possible truth.35 Without the possible-
worlds lingo, the explanation is as follows. It is not necessarily true (although it actually is true)
that Socrates (or any other contingent existent, for that matter) exists. It follows that (2) could
have been true. But had (2) been true, Socrates would have existed-or so one might think. The
reason for thinking so is that in (2) something (namely nonexistence) seems to be predicated of
Socrates. Any proposition in which something is predicated of Socrates requires for its truth that
Socrates exist. The worrisome conclusion is that, had Socrates not existed, there would have
been a nonexistent object, namely Socrates, so M would have been true.
Plantinga offers a way out. He notes that, in this reasoning in favor of PA, it is said of proposition
(2) both that it entails that Socrates exists and that it could have been true. Plantinga finds that
objectionable. He says that we need to distinguish between two propositions:
(2') It is false that Socrates exists
and
(2") Socrates is nonexistent.
(2') classifies as false the proposition that Socrates exists. On the other hand, (2") says of
he exists in the present. Rather, we mean that he exists at some point in time: past, present or future.
35 The conclusion in the explanation is that, in W, Socrates has being, not possible being. Accordingly, there is no use
in this explanation for the assumption in PA that (3) would have been true had W obtained. This assumption is
needed in PA because the conclusion of PA is that it is possible that there should have been possible nonexistent
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Socrates that he does not exist: that he is an object x such that it is not the case that x exists. Now
that we have the distinction between (2') and (2"), we can ask: is (2) identical with (2') or with
(2")? If (2) is identical with (2'), then although (2) could have been true (Socrates is a contingent
existent), (2) does not entail that Socrates exists ((2') does not predicate anything of Socrates).
But if (2) does not entail that Socrates exists, then the truth of (2) with respect to W does not
entail that M is true with respect to W. PA therefore fails. On the other hand, if (2) is identical
with (2"), then although (2) entails that Socrates exists ((2") predicates something of Socrates),
(2) could not have been true.36 But if (2) could not have been true, then PA has a false premise,
namely that (2) would have been true had W obtained. PA therefore fails. (2) is either (2') or (2").
Either way, Plantinga concludes, PA fails.
This may be a successful response to an argument for the conclusion that M is a possible truth,
but I don't think it applies to MA. MA does not involve a failure to make a distinction that is
analogous to the distinction between (2') and (2"). MA may have the presupposition that we think
about imaginary objects when we deny that they exist. This is not the thesis that we think about
imaginary objects when we say of them that they are nonexistent. It is not said in MA of
imaginary objects that they are nonexistent.3 7 Besides that, M is a contradiction! Nobody (well,
perhaps with the exception of Meinong) would really want to argue for the conclusion that M is a
possible truth. It is P that should have been the object of Plantinga's considerations, not M. My
hypothesis that Plantinga fails to appreciate the distinction between P and C explains why he is
objects.
36 (2") entails that Socrates exists, but it says of him that he does not exist, so (2") cannot be true.
37 If you want to put too fine a point on it, you might say that Moore did not use the word 'exist' (and its cognates) in
formulating MA. My point remains. MA4 may have the presupposition that we think about imaginary objects when we
deny that there are such objects. This is not the thesis that we think about imaginary objects when we say of them that
they are objects such that there are no such objects. We do not say of imaginary objects that they are objects such
64
spending so much time on an argument for the conclusion that what is in fact Meinong's blatant
contradiction is a possible truth.
4
I think that reductionists might actually argue along the lines of PA for the conclusion that the
possibilist thesis is a possible truth. Suppose the reductionist applies the word 'exists' only to
actual objects but lets his variables range over everything whatever. He would argue as follows
for the conclusion that the possibilist thesis is a possible truth. Let W be a possible world in
which Socrates does not exist. Had W obtained
(2) Socrates does not exist
and
(3) Possibly, Socrates exists
would have been true. (3) entails:
(4) For some object x, x=Socrates
-or so the reductionist would say. (2), in conjunction with (4), entails:
(5) For some object x, x does not exist.
(5), in conjunction with the thesis that every object is a possible object, entails:
(6) For some object x, x is possible and x does not exist,
which is the possibilist thesis P, when 'exists' applies only to actual objects. The reductionist
would conclude that P is true with respect to W, and that the possibilist thesis is a possible truth.
Note that Plantinga's distinction between (2') and (2") should cut no ice with reductionists. They
would grant that there are two ways to negate the sentence 'Socrates is an x such that x exists'.
that there are no such objects.
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The negation sign might have a large scope:
L -(Socrates is an x such that x exists).
The negation sign might also have a small scope:
S Socrates is an x such that -(x exists).
But, from a reductionist standpoint, this distinction of scope results in no difference in truth
conditions! According to the reductionist, if the word 'exists', as it appears in L and S, is
restricted to apply only to actual objects, then both L and S are true with respect to possible
worlds in which Socrates does not exist, and both L and S are false with respect to possible
worlds in which Socrates does exist.38 Also according to the reductionist, if the word 'exists', as
it appears in L and S, applies to anything whatever, then both L and S are false with respect to
every possible world.39 Thus for both interpretations of 'exists', L and S are necessarily
equivalent-or so the reductionist would say. If so, then at least from a reductionist standpoint,
PA as an argument for the conclusion that the possibilist thesis is a possible truth escapes
Plantinga's allegation of a fallacy.
II Semantical and Metaphysical Considerations on Actuality
5
Actualism is the doctrine that every possible object is an actual object. Many actualists believe in
38 The reductionist and the primitivist (a primitivist is anybody who denies Reductionism) disagree only about the
truth value of S with respect to possible worlds in which Socrates does not exist. According to the reductionist, had
any such world obtained, Socrates would have been a non-actual object: S would have been true. According to the
primitivist, had any such world obtained, there would have been no such object as Socrates: S would have been false.
39 The reductionist and the primitivist disagree only about the truth value of L with respect to possible worlds in
which Socrates does not exist. According to the reductionist, had any such world obtained, Socrates would have
existed (he would have been a non-actual object): L would have been false. According to the primitivist, had any
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the existence of possible worlds and they analyze statements of modality in terms of them.
Possible-worlds actualists say that a proposition is a possible truth just in case it is true with
respect to some possible world and that an object is possibly so-and-so just in case it is so-and-so
in some possible world. Now only of one possible world such actualists say that it is an actual
world. They say that a proposition is true just in case it is true with respect to that particular
world and that an object is so-and-so just in case it is so-and-so in that world.
But how could every possible object be an actual object, when some possible worlds are not
actual? This seems like a contradiction. Actualists would explain that they use the term 'actual'
in two different ways. They say that an object is an actual object in the sense that it exists in the
actual world, but the actual world is actual in the sense that it obtains.
One cannot attribute this ambiguous language to Lewis. Lewis also believed that there are non-
actual possible worlds, but he held that they-as well as the objects that exist in them-do not
exist in the actual world. Lewis was not an actualist. But if it is not true that everything exists in
the actual world, then what makes the actual world special? Lewis thought that nothing really
does:
It is true that our world alone is actual; but that does not make our world special, radically different from all
other worlds (Lewis 1970: 18).
By way of explanation, Lewis suggested his doctrine that (IA) 'actual' is an indexical term. He
enunciates IA immediately next:
I suggest that "actual" and its cognates should be analyzed as indexical terms: terms whose reference varies,
depending on relevant features of the context of utterance. The relevant feature of context, for the term
"actual," is the world at which a given utterance occurs. According to the indexical analysis I propose, "actual"
such world obtained, Socrates would not have existed: L would have been true.
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(in its primary sense) refers at any world w to the world w. "Actual" is analogous to "present," an indexical
term whose reference varies depending on a different feature of context: "present" refers at any time t to the
time t (Lewis 1970: 18).
But what is the primary sense of 'actual', the sense in which it is said to be an indexical term?
Lewis explains:
... we can distinguish primary and secondary senses of "actual" by asking what world "actual" refers to at a
world w in a context in which some other world v is under consideration. In the primary sense, it still refers to
w, as in "If Max ate less, he would be thinner than he actually is." In the secondary sense it shifts its reference
to the world v under consideration, as in "If Max ate less, he would actually enjoy himself more" (Lewis 1970:
19).40
In the sense that Lewis calls primary, at any world W, 'actual' refers to W, the world of utterance.
It seems to me that 'actual' does not have the primary sense in the sentence:
S If Max ate less, he would be thinner than he actually is.
The thesis that 'actual' has the primary sense in S is compatible with the fact that S has the truth
value that it has. Suppose that Max is as thin as he could possibly be. Let L(a) be a possible
world that is as similar to a as much as Max's eating less than he does in a permits. According to
the analysis of counterfactual conditionals, S is true just in case Max is thinner in L(cz) than he is
in the world that 'actual' refers to. If 'actual' has the primary sense, then (since we utter the word
'actual' at a) 'actual' refers to a. If so, then the analysis of counterfactuals implies that S is true
just in case Max is thinner in L(a) than he is in a. Since Max is as thin as he could possibly be,
Max is not thinner in L(a) than he is in a. S is therefore false. This is a positive result for the
40 Lewis speaks of "the world under consideration" where Max eats less, but the uniqueness of reference that is
conveyed by the use of the definite article need not hold according to Lewis's own analysis of counterfactual
conditionals (See Analysis 3 in Lewis (1973: 10). The sentence 'If Max ate less, he would actually enjoy himself
more' is true according to this analysis if and only if some (accessible) world in which Max eats less and enjoys
himself more is closer to the actual world than any world in which Max eats less and does not enjoy himself more, if
there are any (accessible) worlds in which Max eats less. There might be more than one world that satisfies this
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thesis that 'actual' has the primary sense in S: since Max is as thin as he could possibly be, S
should be false. But now, let P be the proposition that S expresses. The thesis that 'actual' has
the primary sense in S seems to be incompatible with the thesis that S expresses P. P is a
possible truth: there are possible worlds W in which Max is such that, if he ate less than he does
(in W), he would be thinner than he is (in W). Let M be such a world and let L(M) be a world that
is as similar to M as much as Max's eating less than he does in M permits. According to the
analysis of counterfactuals, S is true with respect to Mjust in case Max is thinner in L(M) than he
is in the world that 'actual' refers to with respect to M. But if 'actual' has the primary sense, then
'actual' refers to a with respect to M: .a is the world of utterance and, in the primary sense,
'actual' always refers to the world of utterance! If so, then according to the analysis of
counterfactuals, S is true with respect to M just in case Max is thinner in L(M) than he is in a.
Since Max is as thin as he could possibly be, Max is not thinner in L(M) than he is in a. S is
thereforefalse with respect to M. But P is true with respect to M. If 'actual' has the primary sense
in S, then S does not express P. It follows that 'actual' does not have the primary sense in S.
When 'actual' does have the primary sense, the function of the actuality sentence operator is the
inverse of the semantic function of the necessity operator. Every result of putting a sentence that
expresses a necessary truth for the dots in 'Necessarily...' expresses a true proposition. In the
primary sense of 'actual', every result of putting a sentence that expresses a truth for the dots in
'Actually...' expresses a necessary truth. It is surely not necessary that Boston should be the
capital of Massachusetts. It is possible that Cambridge should have been the capital of
Massachusetts. However, in the primary sense of 'actually', it is necessary that, actually, Boston
description.
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is the capital of Massachusetts. This sense of 'actual' seems to me to be esoteric. It is a sense that
may be grasped by semanticists of modality, but it is not a sense that ordinary folks commonly
associate with the word 'actual'. Everybody should agree that, actually, Boston is the capital of
Massachusetts. Very few people would say that it is necessary that this should actually be so. If I
am right that the so-called primary sense of 'actual' is not a common sense, then it is not a
primary sense either. Now even if in this sense (however you want to call it), 'actual' is indexical,
since it is a contrived sense, IA cannot be consequential.
6
Van Inwagen argues for the conclusion that IA is not an indexical theory on the ground that it is
compatible with:
[PR] There are many possible worlds. All of them exist, though, of course, only one of them is actual. Its
actuality consists in its having a certain property-actuality-that the others all lack, though each of
them might have had it (Van Inwagen 1980: 412).
PR is incompatible with "any theory that could properly be called an indexical theory"-or so
Van Inwagen's argument goes.
To begin with, I think that IA is not compatible with PR. Note the last clause of PR: "though each
of them might have had it". 1A pertains only to what Lewis calls the primary sense of 'actual'. In
that sense, none of the non-actual worlds might have had the property of being the actual world.
To say that a non-actual possible world W might have been actual is to say that 'actual' refers to
W with respect to some non-actual world V. But, in the primary sense, 'actual' refers to a with
respect to any world V, not to W. In the primary sense of'actual', being the actual world is being
this world. Being this world is a property that the actual world has necessarily and it is
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impossible that any other world should have had this property. This is analogous with indexical
terms in their similarly defined primary senses. In the primary sense of the term 'today', on any
day d, 'today' refers to d, even when another day is under consideration. In this sense, no other
day in history was today: many days were called 'today'-yesterday, to take a recent example-
but they were not today. Or consider the indexical term 'I'. No one other than I is I. People other
than I refer to themselves as 'I' but they are not I.
If PR is incompatible with IA, then, as it stands, Van Inwagen's argument for the conclusion that
IA is not an indexical theory fails. We might save his argument by trimming PR. Consider the
assumption that "any theory that could properly be called an indexical theory" of 'actual' is
incompatible with:
PR' There are many possible worlds. All of them exist, though, of course, only one of them is actual. Its
actuality consists in its having a certain property-actuality-that the others all lack.
I think that any theory that is consistent with IA is also consistent with PR ' This is because IA
implies PR ' If, at any world W, 'actual' refers to W, then (if there are many possible worlds) at
any world W, W is actual and the other worlds are not actual. It follows that the actual world has
(in the actual world) a property that the worlds that are not actual do not have: it is actual and
they are not. Van Inwagen might object that in IA nothing is said about properties, whereas PR'
does talk about properties. If so, then IA does not imply PR '-or so his objection might be. In
reply, I would grant that the word 'property' does not occur in the formulation of IA, whereas it
does occur in the formulation of PR C So, what? Consider an analogy. Suppose somebody held
the thesis that if the word 'here' is indexical, then there is no such property as the property of
being here. My response would be that there is such a property as the property of being here. I
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have this property: I am here. In contrast with me, many things are not here. If I am here and
other things are not here, then I have a property that things that are not here lack: the property of
being here. Similarly, if there is a world that is actual and there are worlds that are not actual,
then the world that is actual has a property that the others all lack: the property of being actual.
Van Inwagen also argues for the conclusion that IA is not an indexical theory because
... it leaves out something essential to the idea of indexicality...:a possible world (like a place or a time) is a
context or circumstance of utterance (Van Inwagen 1980: 413).
I agree that the idea that a possible world is a circumstance of utterance is essential to the
indexicality of 'actual'. It seems that one could accept IA and reject the thesis that 'actual' is
indexical, saying that a possible world is not a circumstance of utterance. But surely, Lewis
presupposes that a possible world is a circumstance of utterance, so the question that should
concern us is whether this presupposition is true. I think it is. Utterances are events and events
take place not only at certain times and certain locations: they take place in possible worlds. If so,
then I don't see any reason why we should not consider possible worlds to be circumstances of
utterance, circumstances that, together with times, locations, and other circumstances, constitute
contexts in which utterances are made. (There may be a difference between the way the notion of
a context of utterance relates to possible worlds and the way it relates to times and to places in
which utterances take place. Suppose we consider, all the possible contexts in which a given
utterance could have been made. In each possible world the utterance takes place in at most one
context. On the other hand, for any given time in which it was made, an utterance takes place in
many possible contexts. The same is true for the place of utterance. For our purposes, this
difference does not matter.)
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According to Van Inwagen, the conjunction of IA and:
CU ...to specify the world in which an utterance is spoken is to specify a circumstance under which that
utterance is spoken (Van Inwagen 1980: 413).
does imply that 'actual' is indexical. But Van Inwagen says of CU that is not "coherent" because
it presupposes that
...there must be such a thing as the world in which an utterance containing 'the actual world' is spoken (Van
Inwagen 1980:416).
Van Inwagen says that this uniqueness does not obtain:
But it does not seem to be the case that each utterance of 'the actual world' takes place in a single world. Last
week, talking to my class in the philosophy of religion, I said, "There is much evil in the actual world." This
utterance of 'the actual world' was, I suppose, a particular event, and, I would suppose, this very event took
place in many distinct possible worlds. It seems evident, for example, that if any given electron in the
Andromeda galaxy had failed to exist, this event (my utterance of 'the actual world') would nevertheless have
taken place (Van Inwagen 1980: 416).
It is true that Lewis speaks of "the world at which a given utterance occurs". In Lewis's theory of
possible worlds, utterances are world-bound events. However, the way philosophers usually think
of possible worlds, the fact that the same utterance could have taken place even if things had
been different from the way they are implies that the very same utterance took place in other
possible worlds, as well as in the actual world. But why does it matter that the utterance in
question took place in many possible worlds? Presumably because the uniqueness that is
conveyed by the use of the definite article in the formulation of CU ("the world in which an
utterance is spoken") does not obtain. But it does obtain, just as the uniqueness that is conveyed
by uses of 'the' in 'The cat is on the mat' obtains, even though there are many cats.
There are possible contexts in which Van Inwagen's utterance took place in the Parthenon in
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Athens in the year 432 BC. This does not preclude us from talking about the place where the
utterance was made and about the time when it was made. Indeed, we do speak about the place
and the time of utterance when we are talking about unquestionably indexical expressions such
as 'here' and 'now'. The reason for that is that we only speak about the place where an utterance
was made and about the time when it was made with respect to a particular context of
utterance. 4 1 With respect to the actual context in which it was made, the place in which Van
Inwagen's utterance was made was the classroom where he taught the class in the philosophy of
religion, and the time in which the utterance was made was sometime during that class.
Similarly, we only speak about the world in which an utterance was made with respect to a
particular context in which the utterance was made. Each possible context in which a given
utterance was made determines a unique possible world in which the utterance was made. Thus,
with respect to the actual context in which Van Inwagen's utterance was made, there is a unique
world in which that utterance was made: it is the actual world. If so, then the uniqueness that is
conveyed by the use of the word 'the' in the formulation of CU does obtain.
Van Inwagen's main complaint against IA is that it has a
... far-reaching consequence: that every definite description (with the possible exception of "rigid" definite
descriptions like 'the even prime') is an indexical phrase. Take, for example, 'the originator of the Theory of
Relativity'. Though Einstein in fact enjoys the distinction of being the referent of this phrase, he might not
have. There are worlds in which, e.g., Calvin Coolidge is the originator of the Theory of Relativity... And thus
(a possible world being a circumstance of utterance), 'the originator of the Theory of Relativity' depends for its
reference upon the circumstances in which it is uttered, as does any other "non-rigid" description. ... 'the
originator of the Theory of Relativity' ought not to be any sort of indexical (Van Inwagen 1980: 413,414).
41 Consider the thesis that, on any day d, an utterance of the term 'today' refers to d. This thesis is true when we
limit our discussion to reference in the actual world: today's utterances of the word 'today' could have been made
74
I am not sure that this consequence is too far-reaching. I know that, usually when people talk
about indexical expressions, they talk about personal pronouns such as 'I' and 'you', and
demonstrative pronouns such as 'this' and 'that'. They also talk about adverbs such as 'here',
'now', and 'today', and about adjectives such as 'present'. The list of indexicals surely contains a
few other expressions but it usually does not include non-rigid definite descriptions such as 'The
originator of the Theory of Relativity' (OTR). Still, OTR may be an indexical term. Or at least, it
may have an indexical element to it. If 'actual' is indexical, then since OTR is equivalent to 'the
actual originator of the Theory of Relativity, OTR might be an indexical term. But then, Van
Inwagen does not think that 'actual' is an indexical term.
But why isn 't OTR an indexical term? Van Inwagen says that it is a conviction of his that it isn't:
Upon examining the intuitions that underlie this conviction, I find that they may be embodied in the following
principle: (P) If R is a referring phrase, and if it is not possible that there be distinct occasions of utterance A
and B such that, on occasion A, R refers to some object 0, and on B, R does not refer to O, then R is not
indexical (Van Inwagen 1980: 414).
Van Inwagen says that he can claim no more for the principle P than that he finds it plausible. It
might be held that it is essential to indexicals that their references vary from one occasion to
another. If it possible that an indexical R refer to some object O, then it must also be possible for
R not to refer to O. But P poses a stricter requirement of variance. It requires same-world
variance of reference: the O-referring utterance and the non-O-referring utterance should occur in
the same possible world. But why should we think that indexicality requires same-world variance
of reference? Van Inwagen does not really say. This may seem like an arbitrary requirement that
begs the question.
yesterday. If they had been made yesterday, they would have referred to yesterday, not to today.
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Van Inwagen thinks that the problem with the indexical analysis is that it presupposes that
possible worlds are circumstances of utterance: he takes the indexical analysis to be a
conjunction of IA and CU. But the conjunction of IA and CU does not imply that OTR is
indexical. IA is irrelevant to the conclusion, so consider:
ROTR At any world W, OTR refers to the originator of the theory of relativity at W.
I guess that Van Inwagen would take the conjunction of ROTR and CU to imply that OTR is
indexical. The quoted passage suggests that he thinks that ROTR is true, so I guess that, thinking
that OTR is not an indexical term, Van Inwagen would infer that CU is false. Since he takes CU
to be a conjunct in the indexical analysis, his subsequent inference would be to the conclusion
that the indexical analysis is also false. Now I don't think that it really follows that CU is false.
Note that the inference from the conjunction of ROTR and CU to the conclusion that OTR is
indexical has the presupposition:
L Any term whose reference varies depending on relevant features of the context of
utterance is an indexical term.
Consequently, if OTR is not indexical, then the conjunction of CU and L is false. But if so, then it
follows that CU is false only on the assumption that L is true. But L must be false. Otherwise,
almost every term is an indexical term, even proper names turn out to be indexical! Some proper
names refer at different occasions to different objects. The name 'George Bush' changes its
reference from one context of conversation to another. These days it mostly refers to the former
governor of Texas, but ten years ago or so, the very same name referred to a different man in
many contexts. Now, we don't want to say that any proper name that is a name of more than one
object is an indexical term. Since L has this unwelcome implication, it must be rejected.
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Van Inwagen examines a "premise from which something that might reasonably be called an
indexical theory of actuality could be derived," namely that the phrase 'the actual world' means
'this world'. But then he argues that the phrase 'this world' has no clear meaning:
But I am doubtful whether ['this world'] has any very clear meaning. I am doubtful about this because I am
doubtful about whether it is possible to make ostensive reference to the actual world... The problem is this:
each of us exists in many worlds and, moreover, exists in many worlds epistemically indistinguishable from the
actual world... Now if it is possible to make ostensive reference to the actual world, then there must be some
sense in which the actual world is salient for us, some way in which it stands out. But how could it stand out
among all those worlds from which it is indistinguishable (Van Inwagen 1980: 419)?
I think it is right that the actual world is not salient for us. Although the actual world is the way
everything is, whereas every other world is merely a way things could have been, the actual
world is not epistemically distinguishable from many other worlds. However, I am not sure it
follows that the phrase 'this world' has no meaning.42 Consider an analogy. Suppose I am
completely lost in the woods. My location is not salient for me in the sense that any location in
the woods L is such that, for all I know, I may be at L. Still, it seems that the term 'here' (or 'this
place'), in my mouth in this situation, denotes my location. If I say, "I am here," then I assert a
true proposition even if I am not in a position to know exactly which proposition it is: any
location in the woods L is such that, for all I know, the proposition I assert may be to the effect
that I am at L. I think Van Inwagen would say in response that there is something distinctive
about my location: it is the place in which a certain thought occurs to me-an event I am aware
of-whereas no world is the world at which any event that anyone is aware of occurs. 43 I grant
that my location is unique in that it is the place in which my thought occurs to me, whereas the
42 Van Inwagen admits that "all of us who use the language of possible worlds occasionally speak of "this world,"
and no one seems to be much troubled by this phrase" (Van Inwagen 1980:419).
43 See ft. 11 in Van Inwagen (1980: 420).
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thought occurs to me in many possible worlds. Still, being unique in this way does not render my
location salient for me: for all I know I could be having the same thought in other locations.
7
Another objection to IA is that it is incompatible with Actualism. Consider the following passage
from Adams:
According to the indexical theory, actuality is a property which the actual world possesses, not absolutely, but
only in relation to us, its inhabitants. Absolutely considered, the actual as such does not have a different status
from the possible as such... The indexicalist doctrine seems very implausible to me. It is greatly at variance with
our normal way of thinking about actuality, which I am very reluctant to give up. We normally believe that
actuality as such is, absolutely considered, a special metaphysical status-that the actual is, absolutely
considered, more real than the merely possible. We do not think that the difference in respect of actuality
between Henry Kissinger and the Wizard of Oz is just a difference in their relations to us (Adams 1974:
194,195).
Call this objection the objection from relativity and let RA be the doctrine that "actuality is a
property which the actual world possesses not absolutely, but only in relation to us, its
inhabitants".
The objection from relativity has two parts. The first is that IA implies RA. IA implies that so-
called actual objects such as Kissinger are similar, in respect of actuality, to so-called non-actual
objects such as the Wizard of Oz: Kissinger is actual at some worlds and the Wizard of Oz is
actual at some worlds. It follows that, when we consider things from an absolute standpoint, we
see no difference, in respect of actuality, between actual objects and non-actual objects-or so
the first part of the objection from relativity goes. The second part of the objection from relativity
is that RA is incompatible with Actualism. Adams says that we do not think that the difference, in
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respect of actuality, between Kissinger and the Wizard of Oz is "just" a difference in relation to
us. I think he means that we do not think that the difference in respect of actuality between
Kissinger and the Wizard of Oz is a difference in relation to us. We are actualists: we believe that
every possible object is an actual object. If so, then the difference between actual objects and
non-actual objects is that actual objects exist and non-actual objects do not exist.
I find the first part of the objection from relativity objectionable: it seems to me that IA does not
imply RA. Actuality is a relative term in IA: IA does not say anything about what is (simply)
actual and what is not (simply) actual. IA has therefore no implication whatever regarding how
things are considered from an absolute standpoint. If both Kissinger and the Wizard of Oz say, "I
am actual," then IA implies that what each of them says is true at the worlds in which he says it.
But IA is compatible with the metaphysical doctrine that ca is the way things are. If a is the way
things are, then what Kissinger says is true and what the Wizard of Oz says is not true. If a is the
way things are, then there is an absolute difference, in respect of actuality, between Kissinger and
the Wizard of Oz: Kissinger is actual and the Wizard of Oz is not actual.
8
Lewis held the so-called modal realist doctrine (MR) that possible worlds are physical universes,
things of the same sort as the world we inhabit. If so, then the actual world is a small part of what
there is. Stalnaker objects. He says:
The thesis that there is no room in reality for other things than the actual world is not, like solipsism, based on a
restrictive theory of what there is room for in reality, but rather on the metaphysically neutral belief that "the
actual world" is just another name for reality. (Stalnaker 1976: 229).
I am not sure it is a metaphysically neutral matter of meaning that the phrase 'the actual world' is
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another name for reality. It is another name for reality (I think) but that it is another name for
reality is a metaphysical doctrine, namely Actualism. At any rate, Stalnaker objects to the idea
that one could argue for MR on the assumption that IA is true. I accept his objection, but I think it
could be strengthened. Stalnaker says:
[IA] seems to imply that the actuality of the actual world--the attribute in virtue of which it is actual-is a
world-relative attribute. It is an attribute which our world has relative to itself, but which all the other worlds
have relative to themselves too; so the concept of actuality does not distinguish, from an absolute standpoint,
the actual world from the others. But if there is no absolute property of actuality, does this not mean that,
looking at things from an objective point of view, merely possible people and their surroundings are just as real
as we and ours (Stalnaker 1976: 228)?
This argument is of the form: "IA implies RA, and RA implies MR. Therefore, IA implies MR."
Stalnaker blocks the inference by arguing for the conclusion that IA does not imply RA. I agree
that IA does not imply RA: I argued for this conclusion in my response to the objection from
relativity. I also think that RA does not imply MR. Suppose that, as Stalnaker maintains, possible
worlds are complex properties that a total physical universe might exemplify. Suppose further
that no possible world is exemplified. (This is not part of Stalnaker's theory.) If so, then RA is
true: actuality is a relative property just as it is a relative property in Lewis's theory. But then MR
is false: the worlds are abstract, they are not physical universes. If so, then both premises of the
argument that Stalnaker objects to are false. Still, it does not follow that IA does not imply MR.
I think that one can do more than block the inference from IA to MR. I will argue for the
conclusion that the inference is not valid. I think that MR implies RA. When a New Yorker and a
Bostonian say, "I am a local," they both speak truly. It makes no sense to wonder who among
them (if any) is really a local, who is a local in an absolute sense. There is no such sense: being a
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local is a relative property. Actuality in Lewis's theory is similar to the property of being a local.
According to Lewis, if both an otherworldly man and I say, "I am actual," then we both speak
truly. This is a consequence of Lewis's doctrine that possible worlds are physical universes,
things of the same sort as the world we inhabit. If possible worlds are physical universes, then,
when we say of the actual world that it is actual, we cannot say more than that it is our world,
actuality must be a relative property. Now if IA does not imply RA, and MR implies RA, then (by
the transitivity of implication) JA does not imply MR.
Stalnaker's objection to the premise that IA implies RA is this:
The mistake in this reasoning, I think, is in the assumption that the absolute standpoint is a neutral one, distinct
from the view from within any possible world. The problem is avoided when one recognizes that the standpoint
of the actual world is the absolute standpoint, and that it is part of the concept of actuality that this should be so
(Stalnaker 1976: 229).
If the standpoint of a is the absolute standpoint, then-since a is actual from the standpoint of
a--a is actual from the absolute standpoint: a is actual and RA is false. Now Stalnaker claims
that it is a "mistake" to say that the absolute standpoint is world-independent. This seems to me
to be too strong. To begin with, it would be enough to argue for the conclusion that IA is
compatible with the thesis that RA is false. Furthermore, Stalnaker is not standing on neutral
ground here. Lewis would definitely take issue with the claim that it is a mistake to say that the
absolute standpoint is world-independent. Their different opinions as to what the absolute
standpoint is are inseparable from the doctrines that Stalnaker and Lewis hold as to what kind of
an object the actual world is. Stalnaker's view that the standpoint of the actual world is the
absolute standpoint follows from his doctrine that the actual world is the way things are. If the
actual world is the way things are, then only what is true with respect to the actual world is
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(simply) true. Actualism follows: only things that exist in the actual world exist. Lewis's view
that the absolute standpoint is world-independent follows from his thesis that possible worlds are
physical universes. If possible worlds are physical universes, then the way things are in any
possible world is the way they (simply) are. There is only one point of view, Lewis would say,
and if it is unique, then it must be absolute. Thus, both opinions as to the nature of the absolute
standpoint are metaphysically biased.
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